Abstract: In the context of Viet Nam considering the potential deployment of small modular reactors (SMRs), the central legal question concerning the national nuclear legal framework is how regulations on SMR licensing should be improved in order to establish a licensing model that both ensures safety, transparency, and effectiveness in state administrative governance, and remains compatible with the characteristics and flexible deployment orientation of this technology. This question arises from the fact that Viet Nam’s current legal framework governing the licensing of nuclear power plants has primarily been developed on the assumption of large-scale nuclear power plants; therefore, it has not yet fully covered the specific legal requirements relating to licensing procedures, safety standards, and emergency planning zones, together with the capacity and role of the licensing authority. On that basis, the article adopts the experience of the United States - a country that has gradually developed an SMR licensing mechanism within the existing legal framework while simultaneously establishing relatively specific licensing review practices through specialized institutions and procedures - as a basis for comparison with Vietnamese law. Through analysis and comparison, the article proposes several orientations for improving regulations on SMR licensing in Viet Nam in accordance with the approach adopted under United States law, while ensuring compatibility with the institutional conditions, governance capacity, and energy development context of Viet Nam.
Keywords: Nuclear energy, small modular reactors (SMRs), carbon neutrality, Net-Zero.
Introduction
Nuclear energy technology is undergoing a profound transformation, marked by the rapid emergence of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)—a type of compact nuclear reactor designed with an electrical output ranging from 10 MWe to less than 300 MWe and capable of modular assembly, factory fabrication, and transportation to the project site for installation.[1] The distinguishing features of SMRs include enhanced safety, smaller scale, and significantly lower residual heat generation than large nuclear reactors. These characteristics reduce the risk of widespread nuclear accidents while facilitating deployment in areas with high population density or limited infrastructure.[2] The flexibility of manufacturing, lower initial capital costs, and shorter construction periods compared to conventional reactors further highlight the advantages of this technology.[3]
Today, several major countries, including China, Russia, and Argentina, have launched SMR projects, demonstrating the initial deployment of this technology in practice.[4] The most notable example is China, where the country's first commercial SMR nuclear power plant entered commercial operation at the end of 2023 with a capacity of 150 MWe, marking an important milestone in the practical application of Generation IV reactor technology.[5][6] In Europe, the European Union (EU) has formally recognized SMRs as a component of its decarbonization strategy under the Green Deal.[7] At the same time, the “Accelerating SMRs for Net Zero” initiative was launched at COP28 to promote coordination among research institutions, industry stakeholders, and regulatory authorities.[8] Other major countries, including Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and India, are also investing in research and gradually integrating SMRs into their national energy strategies, with prominent projects such as NuScale, GE-Hitachi BWRX-300, Westinghouse AP300, and French Nuward currently under development and entering the initial licensing process.[9] Beyond governmental efforts, the SMR market has also attracted major technology corporations. Companies such as Amazon, Google, Meta, and Microsoft have invested in SMRs to meet the growing demand for clean, stable, and reliable electricity for data centres and artificial intelligence production facilities.[10]
SMRs represent a promising technological solution. They can help balance renewable energy sources and conventional fuels, thereby contributing to a secure and flexible energy strategy. However, to fully realize this potential, a clear legal framework is required to facilitate the development of a sufficiently scaled supply chain, attract stable investment, and secure long-term commitments from states and international organizations.[11]
As Viet Nam considers restarting its nuclear power programme to ensure energy security and fulfil its net-zero emissions commitments, the potential deployment of SMRs raises new legal issues that extend beyond the traditional regulatory framework applicable to large-scale nuclear power plants. The modular design, mass-production capability, passive safety features, and potential deployment across diverse locations require a comprehensive reassessment of licensing models, safety standards, and state oversight mechanisms. Viet Nam’s current legal framework, including the Law on Atomic Energy 2008 and its implementing regulations, was developed on the assumption of large-scale reactors, with segmented licensing procedures, corresponding safety requirements, and emergency planning zone (EPZ) models. In this context, several key legal questions require clarification: (i) whether the current licensing framework is sufficiently flexible to accommodate the standardized design and mass-production characteristics of SMRs; (ii) whether safety standards and emergency planning requirements should evolve towards a risk-informed approach reflecting the new reactor designs; and (iii) whether the authority, responsibilities, and institutional capacity of state regulatory bodies are adequate to supervise this emerging technological model.
To address these research questions, the authors examine the legal framework governing the licensing of SMR projects in the United States, which is widely regarded as possessing extensive and advanced legislative experience in this field. The study compares and contrasts the U.S. framework with the current legal framework of Viet Nam and relevant guidance issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On the basis of this comparative analysis, the article proposes several recommendations for improving Viet Nam’s legal framework governing SMRs.[12]
I. Regulations on licensing procedures
In the United States, the licensing framework for SMRs is built upon the traditional legal structure established under the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), while also being substantially modernized to accommodate technological innovation through the ADVANCE Act.[11] These legal foundations contribute to shortening licensing timelines, reducing compliance costs, encouraging technological innovation and private investment, while simultaneously ensuring safety, transparency, and efficiency in nuclear regulatory governance.
Specifically, the principal regulations governing SMR licensing are contained in Title 10 – Energy of the CFR, particularly the provisions administered by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), including Parts 50, 52, and 100 of Title 10. Under these regulations, the licensing process for SMRs may proceed through three principal pathways: the traditional licensing process, the standard design certification process, and the combined licensing process.
The first pathway is the traditional licensing process under 10 CFR Part 50, which requires applicants to obtain a Construction Permit (CP) before commencing construction.[12] Upon substantial completion of construction, the applicant must submit an application for an Operating License (OL).[13] The NRC will issue an OL only if the facility has been constructed in accordance with the technical, legal, and safety requirements previously approved. Accordingly, this process applies uniformly to all types of nuclear power plants regardless of technology, generating capacity, or scale.
The second pathway is the Standard Design Certification process, which allows a developer to submit an application for approval of a standardized reactor design without reference to a specific geographical location.[14] This mechanism separates design review from the assessment of site-specific considerations, thereby enabling a standardized SMR design to undergo advance evaluation of technical and safety requirements under the federal regulatory framework. Once a design has been certified, subsequent project developers may reference the certified design during the licensing process, particularly when applying for a Combined License (COL). This reduces duplication in application documentation, shortens review periods, and increases the predictability of the licensing process. For SMR technology, this mechanism is especially significant because it aligns with the characteristics of standardization, mass production, and fleet deployment based on a common design.
The third pathway is the Combined License (COL),[15] which integrates construction and operating authorization into a single licensing application. If granted, a COL authorizes construction to commence immediately and permits operation once the NRC verifies that all operational safety requirements have been satisfied. Through this mechanism, the COL process significantly reduces both licensing time and procedural burdens for SMR projects.[16] The COL review period generally takes approximately 30 months when the applicant references a previously licensed design and approximately 36 months for a first-of-a-kind licensing application. Consequently, licensing timelines may be reduced by approximately half compared to the traditional licensing process (72 months) and by approximately two years compared to other licensing pathways (60 months).[17][18] The COL process consists of several stages: (1) submission of the application; (2) NRC technical review (Safety Review) and environmental review (Environmental Review); (3) public hearings and stakeholder consultations; and (4) issuance of a final decision. Where a design has already been certified for another facility, the COL process may be significantly expedited. Part 100 of Title 10 CFR establishes siting criteria applicable to nuclear power plants licensed under Parts 50 and 52. These criteria include considerations relating to site suitability, exclusion areas,[19] low-population zones,[20] and geological, non-geological, and seismic characteristics relevant to site selection.
In addition, to accommodate the modular nature and reduced scale of SMR designs, the NRC has been developing a new regulatory framework under 10 CFR Part 53 based on a risk-informed and technology-inclusive licensing approach.[21] A risk-informed approach involves assessing the likelihood and consequences of potential accidents and establishing regulatory requirements accordingly to protect the public and the environment.[22] A technology-inclusive approach seeks to create a regulatory framework capable of accommodating a variety of technologies while maintaining an acceptable level of safety.[23] This development indicates a gradual transition by the NRC from a rigid regulatory model toward one that is more adaptable to the novelty and diversity of SMR technologies.[24][25] Furthermore, the NRC has established pre-licensing procedures that enable project developers to engage with the agency before submitting a formal application in order to identify technical requirements applicable to a fleet of SMRs sharing a common design and to address environmental safety considerations transparently.[26] For example, pre-licensing processes have been conducted for the SMR designs developed by NuScale and X-Energy, enabling the NRC to issue design criteria and associated guidance before formal licensing applications were submitted.[27] This approach helps reduce uncertainty during the development of first-of-a-kind SMR designs. Subsequent SMR projects may then rely on the regulatory pathway established by the initial project, thereby reducing legal risks that could adversely affect project implementation schedules.[28]
On 7 October 2023, the United States enacted the ADVANCE Act. In general, the Act is intended to accelerate the commercialization of advanced nuclear reactor technologies, including SMRs. The Act promotes the deployment of advanced nuclear technologies by simplifying procedures, reducing costs, and shortening licensing timelines.[29][30] It requires the NRC to review environmental assessment procedures and expedite licensing processes, particularly for sites that already host nuclear facilities or former industrial locations previously occupied by fossil-fuel power plants.[31]
Compared with international regulatory developments, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established two important platforms supporting SMR licensing: the IAEA Platform on Small Modular Reactors and their Applications (SMR Platform) and the Nuclear Harmonization and Standardization Initiative (NHSI). The SMR Platform serves as an overarching framework providing technical assistance, capacity building, knowledge sharing, and research coordination among participating countries, thereby helping SMR developers identify international licensing standards at an early stage.[32] By contrast, the NHSI focuses on regulatory harmonization, multinational licensing cooperation, and the development of industrial standards aimed at reducing costs and licensing timelines without compromising nuclear safety requirements. Specifically, the NHSI operates through two tracks. The Regulatory Track promotes cooperation among national regulatory authorities regarding licensing procedures and facilitates the sharing of technical assessments during early-stage review and pre-licensing activities.[33] The Industry Track seeks to harmonize standards for SMR manufacturing, construction, and operation, thereby reducing variations in regulatory assessment processes and facilitating approval of SMR designs under substantially equivalent requirements across different jurisdictions.[34] When compared with these international initiatives, the U.S. regulatory framework demonstrates a parallel approach combining domestic reform with international integration. The development of 10 CFR Part 53 and the enactment of the ADVANCE Act, which requires the NRC to coordinate international cooperation among relevant U.S. agencies and international nuclear organizations,[35] illustrate this strategy. Similarly, the expanded use of modern information technologies, including artificial intelligence and machine learning, to support risk-informed inspection and oversight activities,[36] forms part of a broader effort to accelerate licensing while maintaining safety and transparency. Likewise, the IAEA SMR Platform and the NHSI pursue similar objectives at the international level by facilitating the approval of SMR designs across multiple jurisdictions while minimizing duplicative regulatory procedures.
In Viet Nam, the legal framework governing the licensing and deployment of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) remains under development and faces a number of challenges. Previously, the Law on Atomic Energy 2008 established the legal foundation for regulating activities relating to atomic energy, including research, operation, management, transportation of radioactive materials, radioactive waste management, and emergency response. However, this legislation did not establish licensing procedures tailored to modern technologies such as SMRs, which require greater flexibility, smaller-scale deployment, and modular production capabilities. In 2025, the National Assembly amended and enacted a new Law on Atomic Energy, introducing a dedicated chapter on nuclear power plants that regulates matters ranging from site selection, design, manufacturing, and construction to decommissioning. The amended law also permits the application of international standards in certain circumstances, thereby creating a legal basis for the adoption and licensing of SMR designs under international regulatory frameworks without being constrained by gaps or ambiguities in domestic legislation.[37] Nevertheless, the new law currently provides only a sequential licensing process under which project developers must obtain separate licenses for each stage of the facility, including construction, commissioning, and operation, pursuant to Articles 46, 47, and 48. This approach closely resembles the traditional U.S. licensing process and does not fully capitalize on the distinctive characteristics of SMRs. Moreover, the Law on Atomic Energy 2025 does not currently contain provisions regarding pre-licensing arrangements or licensing support mechanisms for first-of-a-kind SMR designs, despite the successful implementation of such mechanisms in leading nuclear jurisdictions including the United States, Canada,[38] and Ukraine,[39] as well as recommendations issued by the IAEA. In addition, the law does not specifically address multi-stage licensing arrangements tailored to the modular architecture and flexible design characteristics of SMRs, notwithstanding explicit recommendations contained in relevant IAEA initiatives.
Drawing upon U.S. experience in SMR licensing, the authors propose several recommendations for improving Viet Nam’s legal framework to ensure flexibility, efficiency, and compliance with international standards. First, Viet Nam should develop a combined licensing process similar to the U.S. COL model, allowing design review, environmental assessment, and construction authorization to be evaluated simultaneously, accompanied by a clear framework of Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) to verify safety commitments prior to operation. Such an approach would reduce licensing timelines and legal risks during the initial stages of project development. Although the Law on Atomic Energy 2025 introduces a dedicated chapter on nuclear power plants and permits the application of international standards where domestic regulations are insufficient, specific provisions concerning ITAAC and preliminary safety analysis reports should be incorporated into implementing regulations to ensure practical flexibility. Second, Viet Nam should establish a risk-informed licensing framework similar to 10 CFR Part 53 in the United States. Such a framework would enable the national nuclear and radiation safety authority to assess SMR designs based on their actual risk profiles. Although the Law on Atomic Energy 2025 grants authority to the nuclear and radiation safety regulator and permits reference to international standards, subordinate legislation should establish detailed requirements concerning Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), a nuclear safety assessment methodology used to evaluate accident likelihoods and consequences based on probability analysis. PRA is widely employed by the NRC, the IAEA, and other international organizations to support risk-informed decision-making.[40] The adoption of such procedures would also facilitate pre-licensing engagement between project developers and regulatory authorities, similar to the approaches adopted for NuScale and X-Energy in the United States. Third, regulations should encourage pre-application consultations between SMR developers and regulatory authorities to identify technical and environmental requirements at an early stage. Such consultations would reduce the risks associated with first-of-a-kind SMR development and help avoid delays once formal applications have been submitted. U.S. experience demonstrates that this approach contributes significantly to regulatory certainty and reduced legal compliance costs.
II. Safety standards and emergency planning zones
With respect to safety standards, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is the authority vested with responsibility for emergency preparedness and nuclear safety zoning. Safety standards and Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) requirements applicable to SMRs represent a combination of the existing regulatory framework and technology-specific adaptations designed to accommodate advanced reactor technologies. The principal regulations in this area are contained in Parts 50, 52, and 53 of Title 10 CFR, together with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.242, issued in November 2023 and effective from 18 December 2023.
Regarding safety standards, similar to conventional nuclear power plants, the NRC requires adherence to the principle of defence in depth, whereby multiple independent and redundant layers of protection are established to safeguard the public against accidents, even in the event that one layer of protection fails.[45] Part 50 requires nuclear facilities to demonstrate compliance with plant technical specifications, emergency procedures, and personnel training requirements. However, because Part 50 was originally developed for earlier generations of large-scale reactors, it has sometimes been criticized as insufficiently flexible when applied to SMR designs, which are smaller in scale, incorporate passive safety systems, and differ significantly in structural configuration. Part 52 continues to rely upon the defence-in-depth principle and requires applicants to demonstrate the ability of the facility to remain safe under design-basis accident conditions. At the same time, it permits modular analysis and the reuse of previously approved licensing documentation, thereby reducing regulatory burdens for SMR developers. Several SMR designs developed by NuScale have been approved under Part 52, demonstrating the practical suitability of this regulatory framework for SMR technology.[46]
Nevertheless, both Parts 50 and 52 of Title 10 CFR remain largely based on regulatory assumptions developed for high-capacity nuclear reactors. This has created a need for a dedicated regulatory framework tailored to advanced nuclear technologies such as SMRs, molten salt reactors,[47] and fast neutron reactors.[48] Consequently, Part 53 of Title 10 CFR - currently under development by the NRC - has emerged as a comprehensive effort to modernize the licensing framework. It is the first NRC regulatory framework to adopt a risk-informed, performance-based, and technology-inclusive approach, enabling safety requirements to be applied flexibly without being tied to specific pre-existing reactor designs.[49] According to the regulatory development documents for Part 53, the objective of the safety framework is to enable advanced reactor developers to demonstrate adequate protection of public health and the environment through quantitative risk performance objectives,[50] rather than strict compliance with prescriptive design requirements. Under the proposed Part 53 framework, project developers may propose safety measures based on Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), beyond-design-basis events (BDBEs),[51] and integrated passive safety systems. One particularly notable feature of the draft Part 53 framework is the incorporation of organizational-level safety governance. Requirements relating to safety culture, organizational risk management capacity, and resilience following disruptive events are treated as equally important as technical requirements.[52] This reflects the NRC’s transition towards a more comprehensive and flexible regulatory approach, which is particularly necessary given that SMRs may be deployed in diverse geographical, social, and industrial environments, including locations near populated areas, remote regions, or even floating installations.
With regard to emergency planning zones, U.S. law has gradually shifted towards an approach based on the characteristics of individual SMR designs rather than maintaining the rigid framework originally developed for large nuclear reactors. Specifically, the NRC has promulgated 10 CFR § 50.160, which permits SMRs to utilize an EPZ framework based on the specific risk profile and generating capacity of each reactor, alongside the traditional requirements applicable to large-scale nuclear power plants. This new regulatory framework was developed in response to SECY-11-0152, jointly submitted by the Director of the NRC Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response and the Director of the Office of New Reactors,[54] and establishes the foundation for a fair, flexible, and technology-neutral licensing system based on projected radiological exposure and actual consequences. Under this framework, SMR developers are required to conduct hazard analyses,[55] taking into account factors such as reduced radioactive source terms, passive safety systems, and integrated reactor designs intended to minimize risk. Consequently, the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ and the Ingestion Pathway EPZ[56] are determined according to the estimated consequences of a postulated accident rather than being based on the fixed radii of 10 miles and 50 miles traditionally applied to conventional reactors.[57] In addition, SMR projects must comply with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.242, which provides detailed guidance regarding emergency preparedness,[58] including requirements for emergency response exercises, accident scenario analyses, and the development of corresponding response plans.[59]
In Viet Nam, efforts to improve the legal framework relating to SMRs have focused on two principal directions: the enactment of the Law on Atomic Energy 2025 to facilitate future SMR deployment and the issuance of technical standards and environmental safety-distance regulations. However, unlike the United States, which develops safety standards and emergency preparedness mechanisms on the basis of risk assessments and actual accident consequences associated with specific reactor designs, Viet Nam’s regulatory framework prior to the entry into force of the Law on Atomic Energy 2025 did not comprehensively address the unique legal requirements applicable to SMRs. This has resulted in several limitations.
First, existing national technical regulations, including QCVN 01:2025/BTNMT on environmental safety distances and Circular No. 07/2025/TT-BTNMT amending Circular No. 02/2022/TT-BTNMT guiding the implementation of the Law on Environmental Protection 2020, primarily focus on environmental risks such as pollution, dust, odour, and noise associated with conventional industrial facilities. By contrast, U.S. regulatory practice determines safety zones for SMRs on the basis of hazard analysis, potential radiological release, and emergency preparedness requirements tailored to specific reactor designs. The currently applicable formula for determining environmental safety distances: LKCATMT = KCN × LKCCS,[60] is suitable for addressing dust, odour, and noise emissions but is not appropriate for determining potential radiological impact zones or nuclear emergency isolation areas. This creates a significant regulatory gap in protecting both the public and the environment when SMRs become operational.
Second, although the amended Law on Standards and Technical Regulations 2025 has strengthened mechanisms for developing sector-specific standards and promoted participation by professional organizations, businesses, and experts in the standards-development process,[61] many critical SMR-specific safety standards - such as requirements concerning passive cooling systems, environmental radiation limits, and emergency isolation design - have yet to be issued. By comparison, the United States has progressed towards establishing a technology-inclusive safety framework that evaluates SMRs according to their technical characteristics and risk profiles rather than applying standards originally designed for large-capacity reactors. The absence of these specialized standards means that Viet Nam’s legal framework currently lacks a sufficiently robust basis for conducting consistent and predictable safety assessments of SMR projects.
Third, existing regulations do not establish a detailed emergency planning framework based on varying levels of accident severity. Vietnamese law does not currently define administrative emergency zones corresponding to different accident levels (for example, Zone I, Zone II, Zone III, and so forth), as recommended under IAEA standards. In contrast, the United States has gradually shifted towards an EPZ framework based on estimated accident consequences rather than fixed-radius emergency zones applicable to all reactor types.[62] Furthermore, there are currently no detailed regulations governing evacuation distances, public evacuation procedures, or inter-agency coordination mechanisms involving healthcare, security, and transportation authorities tailored to the characteristics of SMRs. This regulatory gap not only reduces the practical effectiveness of emergency preparedness but also demonstrates that Viet Nam has not yet fully transitioned towards the risk-informed regulatory approach increasingly adopted by both the United States and the IAEA.
In addition, the environmental impact assessment (EIA) framework established under the Law on Environmental Protection 2020 and Decree No. 08/2022/ND-CP (as amended by Decree No. 05/2025/ND-CP) does not explicitly address SMRs. Existing environmental standards focus primarily on conventional environmental concerns such as domestic wastewater and industrial emissions and do not include criteria specifically addressing radiation, low-level radioactive discharges, or specialized nuclear waste. Consequently, unlike the U.S. model - where environmental review and safety assessment are closely integrated within the licensing process - the EIA framework applicable to SMR projects in Viet Nam currently lacks a sufficiently clear legal basis for assessing radiological impacts and long-term radiation safety risks.
In light of the foregoing, Viet Nam should adjust its legal framework toward a flexible approach based on the specific risk profile of each SMR design, similar to that adopted by the United States, in order to accurately reflect the inherent safety characteristics of this technology. Specifically, Viet Nam should proactively develop regulations permitting the establishment of flexible EPZs,[NHT6] based on the potential radioactive source term of each SMR design, rather than applying a uniform zoning mechanism to all projects as is currently the trend in traditional nuclear power plant projects (e.g., Ninh Thuan).[63] Accordingly, each SMR developer should be allowed to conduct project-specific risk assessments and propose appropriate EPZ arrangements based on technical documentation submitted for review and approval by the competent state authorities. This model ensures compatibility with actual design characteristics while avoiding the imposition of fixed safety radii that may be unsuitable for the scale and technology of SMRs.
Furthermore, in developing emergency planning zones, Viet Nam may consider the two-zone EPZ model currently applied in the United States, including: the Plume Exposure Pathway, which focuses on immediate exposure to radioactive releases through the air; and the Ingestion Pathway, which controls radioactive exposure through contaminated food and water. For SMR designs capable of demonstrating through safety documentation that potential radioactive releases would be minimal or would occur gradually, the scope of these two zones may be significantly reduced, potentially even limited to the plant site boundary, while still ensuring adequate protection of public health. This approach would also reduce administrative burdens and emergency preparedness costs for local authorities, thereby enhancing implementation efficiency.
Finally, in the authors’ view, Viet Nam[NHT7] should encourage research and promulgate a framework regulation on emergency zoning according to accident severity levels, compatible with the Area I, II, III, IV, etc. zoning model employed in IAEA guidance.[64] Such an approach would permit protective zones to be established systematically and effectively based on radiation levels and exposure duration. On that basis, inter-agency coordination procedures should be developed among healthcare, transportation, security, rescue, and communication authorities to establish response scenarios corresponding to each accident level, including evacuation, pharmaceutical distribution, public warning, and the provision of essential logistical support.
III. Capacity and role of regulatory authorities
Within the United States legal system, the authority responsible for regulating and overseeing civilian nuclear safety is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), established under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. The purpose of this Act was to separate the function of energy development (assigned to the Department of Energy (DOE)) from the function of nuclear regulation and safety oversight, which was assigned to the NRC. The NRC is an independent agency composed of five Commissioners nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate,[65] responsible for protecting public health and the environment through rigorous licensing procedures, continuous oversight, and enforcement actions in cases of non-compliance.[66][67] Legally, the NRC implements the framework established by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954[68] and operationalizes it through the provisions of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), particularly Parts 50, 52, and 100. The NRC inherited the authority of the former Atomic Energy Commission under Chapter 14 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, encompassing various functions, including the issuance of binding regulations (rules), technical guidance, construction and operating licenses, operational oversight, site inspections, administrative sanctions, incident investigations, and decision-making based on scientific research and internal risk assessments. The NRC is also empowered to conduct adjudicatory hearings, receive and resolve complaints relating to licensing or enforcement decisions, and encourage the participation of the public and other stakeholders in decision-making processes. Research activities such as accident consequence analysis, risk assessment, and testing of new technologies play an important supporting role in regulatory decision-making.[69]
With respect to licensing, the NRC has the authority to issue various licenses and certifications in the field of nuclear energy, including Design Certifications,[70] Combined Construction and Operating Licenses (COLs),[71] Operating Licenses,[72] License Renewals,[73] as well as approvals concerning license transfers,[74] suspensions,[75] and decommissioning of nuclear facilities.[76] To obtain any type of license, an applicant must submit a complete application dossier to the NRC. The dossier is subject to rigorous review to assess technical validity, compliance with safety standards, and assurance that the proposed nuclear reactor operations will not adversely affect the environment or public health. The NRC’s application and review process is conducted in a transparent and publicly accessible manner, whereby information relating to licensing fees,[77] technical guidance,[78] environmental review reports,[79] public consultation mechanisms,[80] and specific licensing conditions[81] is clearly published on the NRC’s official website.
While U.S. law clearly embodies the principle of separating the function of promoting nuclear energy development from the function of safety regulation and oversight through the establishment of an independent authority, namely the NRC, Vietnamese law has only recently begun to recognize this distinction at the statutory level. The Law on Atomic Energy 2025 establishes a degree of separation in state management of atomic energy. The principle of separating state management functions relating to radiation safety, nuclear safety, and nuclear security from the development and application of atomic energy is implemented through the establishment of two distinct categories of authorities: the central state management authority for atomic energy and the national radiation and nuclear safety authority.[82] This may be regarded as an important legislative advancement, as it demonstrates that Vietnamese law has begun to move closer to the institutional approach adopted by the United States in limiting conflicts of interest between industry development objectives and nuclear safety requirements.
The central state management authority for atomic energy serves as the focal point for comprehensive management of the atomic energy sector.[83] This authority is entrusted with several important responsibilities, including formulating the Strategy for the Development and Application of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes,[84] preparing and appraising plans for the development and application of atomic energy,[85] developing planning content relating to facilities for the storage, treatment, and disposal of nuclear materials,[86] and appraising and granting construction licenses for nuclear power plants.[87] Meanwhile, the national radiation and nuclear safety authority functions as a specialized body assisting the central state management authority for atomic energy in managing and implementing state functions relating to radiation safety, nuclear safety, nuclear security, nuclear safeguards, and other functions and duties prescribed by the Law on Atomic Energy 2025 and other relevant legislation.[88] This authority is responsible for, among other matters, reviewing and approving safety analysis reports, organizing the search, recovery, and response to radiation incidents and nuclear incidents involving radioactive sources and nuclear materials,[89] and advising and assisting the central state management authority for atomic energy.[90]
However, compared with the U.S. model, a fundamental difference is that although Vietnamese law has established the principle of separation, it has not yet fully clarified the legal status, degree of organizational independence, and practical operating mechanisms of the nuclear safety authority. While the NRC is an independent federal agency with authority throughout the licensing, inspection, and enforcement process, the national radiation and nuclear safety authority under the Law on Atomic Energy 2025 is currently designed primarily as a specialized advisory and supporting body and has not yet been clearly established as a fully independent regulator. This distinction may directly affect the objectivity, transparency, and effectiveness of safety assessments in the context of deploying emerging technologies such as SMRs, which require flexible, highly specialized, and independent decision-making mechanisms.
Although the Law on Atomic Energy 2025 supplements the role and responsibilities of the national radiation and nuclear safety authority under Article 8, it does not clearly define the organizational structure and operational apparatus of this authority, despite its critical role in ensuring nuclear safety. Furthermore, on 3 March 2025, the Ministry of Science and Technology established the Vietnam Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Safety (VARANS)[91] as an agency assisting the Minister. Consequently, the question arises as to whether VARANS is intended to serve as the national radiation and nuclear safety authority contemplated under the Law on Atomic Energy 2025. In addition, on 10 January 2025, the Prime Minister issued Decision No. 72/QD-TTg establishing the Steering Committee for Nuclear Power Plant Development to assist the Prime Minister in studying, directing, and coordinating the resolution of important inter-sectoral matters relating to the construction of nuclear power plants and the continued implementation of the Ninh Thuan Nuclear Power Project (the Steering Committee).[92] Questions therefore remain regarding the scope of authority and responsibility of the Steering Committee in relation to VARANS and the national radiation and nuclear safety authority prescribed in Article 8 of the Law on Atomic Energy 2025. This situation demonstrates a lack of clarity and institutional consistency in the design of the nuclear safety regulatory system, particularly regarding organizational structure, legal status, and the allocation of authority among relevant entities. The establishment of a unified state authority responsible for nuclear safety, together with a fully operational organizational structure and governance mechanism, directly affects the assurance of nuclear safety and the licensing of nuclear projects in general and SMR projects in particular. Such an authority constitutes an essential condition for the effective implementation of SMR licensing processes, including pre-licensing and staged licensing procedures as recommended by the IAEA.[93]
Based on the foregoing legal framework, several shortcomings may be identified in the organizational structure and operational mechanisms of state authorities responsible for atomic energy management in Viet Nam.
First, the organizational structure of nuclear regulatory authorities remains fragmented, lacks consistency, and does not ensure sufficient independence. The Ministry of Science and Technology, VARANS, and the Steering Committee maintain relationships that are not yet clearly defined, with each entity performing certain functions independently or cooperating in carrying out tasks prescribed by the Law on Atomic Energy 2025. However, the allocation of powers and responsibilities among these entities occurred during a period of institutional restructuring, consolidation, and reorganization of ministries and ministerial-level agencies, prior to the enactment of the Law on Atomic Energy 2025 by the National Assembly. As a result, the powers and responsibilities of the Ministry of Science and Technology and VARANS are not fully aligned with the provisions of the Law, and, in practice, no legal instrument has expressly designated these entities as the central state management authority for atomic energy and the national radiation and nuclear safety authority, respectively.
Second, according to several members of the National Assembly and experts, the current regulatory structure lacks sufficient independence. VARANS remains subordinate to the Ministry of Science and Technology, while the Vietnam Atomic Energy Institute and the Ministry of Industry and Trade are also involved in nuclear research and development activities. This arrangement may create conflicts of interest between regulatory functions and activities relating to nuclear research or production. The resulting fragmentation in nuclear safety governance therefore falls short of the transparency and specialization standards promoted by the IAEA.[94]
Third, although national policy emphasizes technology transfer, expert training, and localization of equipment, practical localization capacity remains limited because Viet Nam is still at the preparatory stage of nuclear power development. The Vietnam Atomic Energy Institute has assessed that the current capabilities of the workforce and supporting industries are insufficient to implement a sustainable and independent nuclear power programme. Although the Law on Atomic Energy 2025 contains mechanisms to attract and retain qualified personnel, it does not yet establish a specific and comprehensive programme for developing senior experts capable of responding effectively to the complex technical requirements of nuclear energy.[95]
Based on U.S. legal practice and the foregoing analysis of limitations within the current Vietnamese legal framework governing atomic energy management, several recommendations may be proposed for improving the Vietnamese legal system by drawing upon the NRC model of the United States[NHT8] while taking into account Viet Nam’s institutional conditions, with the aim of enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of state management and complying with domestic and international nuclear safety and security standards.
First, the independence of the nuclear safety regulatory authority should be strengthened in a manner compatible with the existing state administrative structure. The model of fully separating safety regulation from the promotion of technological development - as adopted in the United States - provides a valuable reference; however, it requires a high level of expertise, substantial resources, and effective coordination mechanisms. During the transitional period, Viet Nam need not replicate this model in its entirety but may selectively adopt and adapt suitable elements within its current institutional framework. In particular, attention should be given to enhancing functional independence within the existing organizational structure, clearly establishing decision-making mechanisms based exclusively on safety considerations rather than sectoral development objectives, and ensuring that financial, personnel, and technical assessment functions operate with a meaningful degree of independence.
Second, the provisions of the Law on Atomic Energy 2025 relating to the legal status, functions, and relationship between the central state management authority for atomic energy and the national radiation and nuclear safety authority should be further specified. Rather than relying solely on framework provisions, subordinate legislation should clearly define the allocation of powers, accountability mechanisms, and mutual oversight arrangements among the relevant entities. Particular emphasis should be placed on ensuring the independence of safety assessment and licensing activities, even where the authorities concerned remain within the same administrative system, thereby enhancing the transparency and credibility of regulatory decisions.
Third, Viet Nam should develop a licensing and regulatory system based on risk analysis and consequence assessment, similar to the NRC model. This should include diversification of licensing categories (design, operation, equipment certification, and others) and the establishment of rigorous technical review procedures incorporating public participation and scientific scrutiny. Transparency and public access to information throughout the licensing cycle should also be ensured through publicly accessible platforms, thereby strengthening the legitimacy of and public confidence in nuclear projects.
Finally, Viet Nam should make substantial investments in nuclear expert training, establish long-term human resource development programmes, and enhance its capacity for independent technology assessment. Experience from the NRC demonstrates that internal research activities - from risk assessment to technology testing - are essential in supporting evidence-based regulatory decision-making. Viet Nam may therefore consider establishing research units affiliated with the regulatory authority, operating independently and connected to international expert networks such as the IAEA and advanced scientific institutions within the region.
Conclusion
In the context of Viet Nam’s gradual consideration of nuclear power development through Small Modular Reactor (SMR) technology, the improvement of the legal framework governing licensing should be approached as a matter of institutional design rather than merely a technical extension of the regulatory framework applicable to conventional nuclear power plants. A comparison with U.S. law demonstrates that the effectiveness of the SMR licensing regime depends not only on licensing procedures and processes, but also on design review methodologies, safety standards, emergency planning mechanisms, and the degree of independence and specialization of the regulatory authority. Against this backdrop, it can be observed that although the current Vietnamese legal framework has begun to establish a foundation for the adoption of emerging technologies, it has not yet fully adapted to the modular characteristics, standardization potential, and flexible deployment requirements of SMRs. Accordingly, future legal reforms should focus on developing an integrated licensing framework, strengthening risk-informed regulatory approaches, specifying safety standards and emergency planning zones tailored to individual reactor designs, and enhancing the legal status, institutional capacity, and relative independence of the nuclear safety regulatory authority. Such an approach would not only contribute to ensuring nuclear safety and nuclear security but would also facilitate the deployment and commercialization of SMRs in a stable, transparent, and sustainable manner as part of Viet Nam’s energy transition process.
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This article is developed from the university-level scientific research project entitled “Law on Ensuring Nuclear Safety: Experiences from the European Union and Recommendations for Viet Nam”, headed by M.A. Le Minh Nhut under Decision No. 548/QD-DHL dated 25 June 2025 of Ho Chi Minh City University of Law.
[*] Prof. Dr., Ho Chi Minh City University of Law. Email: nhthao@hcmulaw.edu.vn. Accepted for publication on 29 April 2026.
[**] M.A., Ho Chi Minh City University of Law. Email: lmnhut@hcmulaw.edu.vn.
[***] Ho Chi Minh City University of Law. Email: 2253801090008@email.hcmulaw.edu.vn.
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[12] 10 CFR Part 50, Sections 50.10 and 50.35.
[13] 10 CFR Part 50, Sections 50.40 and 50.57.
[14] 10 CFR Part 52, Subpart B.
[15] 10 CFR Part 52, Subpart C.
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[19] Pursuant to 10 CFR §100.11(a)(1), the exclusion area is an area in which an individual located at any point on its boundary for two hours immediately following the onset of the postulated fission product release accident would not receive a total whole-body radiation dose in excess of 25 rem or a thyroid dose from iodine exposure in excess of 300 rem.
[20] Pursuant to 10 CFR §100.11(a)(2), the low population zone is an area in which an individual located at any point on its boundary and exposed to the radioactive cloud resulting from the postulated fission product release accident throughout the entire passage of the cloud would not receive a total whole-body radiation dose in excess of 25 rem or a thyroid dose from iodine exposure in excess of 300 rem.
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[30] United States of America, Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy Act of 2024, Sections 201–208, Chapter II.
[31] United States of America, Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy Act of 2024, Section 506, Chapter V.
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[35] United States of America, Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy Act of 2024, Section 101, Chapter I.
[36] United States of America, Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy Act of 2024, Section 507(3)(c), Chapter V.
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[38] Zulfiandri and Bambang Eko Aryadi, “Pre-Licensing Review in the Power Reactor License Stage: Case Study of Canada”, International Atomic Energy Agency (2 August 2018), https://inis.iaea.org/records/2b15n-zas82.
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[40] Egemen M. Aras and Mihai A. Diaconeasa, “A Critical Look at the Need for Performing Multi-Hazard Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plants”, MDPI (10 October 2021), https://www.mdpi.com/2673-4117/2/4/28/pdf?version=1633857159.
[41] United States of America, Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy Act of 2024, Section 201, Chapter II.
[42] United States of America, Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy Act of 2024, Section 206, Chapter II.
[43] United States of America, Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy Act of 2024, Section 402, Chapter IV.
[44] United States of America, Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy Act of 2024, Section 101, Chapter I.
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[47] A molten salt reactor (MSR) is a nuclear reactor in which the coolant and/or fuel consists of a molten salt mixture. See also: Dien San, “Molten Salt Reactors – The Future Boom of Energy Production”, People’s Public Security Newspaper (5 August 2022, 2:31 PM), https://cand.com.vn/Khoa-hoc-Ky-thuat-hinh-su/lo-phan-ung-muoi-nong-chay-su-bung-no-san-xuat-nang-luong-tuong-lai-i662808.
[48] A fast neutron reactor (FNR) is a nuclear reactor whose core primarily contains neutrons with kinetic energies of approximately 5 MeV, eliminating the need for a neutron moderator and requiring fuel enriched with fissile material. It includes a core for sustaining nuclear chain reactions and a blanket region for capturing excess neutrons, thereby improving fuel efficiency. See also: ScienceDirect, Fast Neutron Reactor, https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/engineering/fast-neutron-reactor.
[50] Risk performance objectives are a set of quantitative risk targets, the exceedance of which (e.g., over the reactor lifetime) may result in an increased likelihood of a nuclear accident.
[53] The EPZ framework under 10 CFR §50.160 includes the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ and the Ingestion Pathway EPZ.
[55] The NRC defines hazard analysis as a process used to identify hazards and their sources and to determine appropriate design features and constraints for controlling or mitigating those hazards. A hazard, according to the NRC, is any potential failure that may threaten life, incur costs, or cause inconvenience. See also: Paul Rebstock, Hazard Analysis: An Outline of Technical Bases for the Evaluation of Criteria, Methodology, and Results, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (17 June 2022), https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2217/ML22172A099.pdf.
[56] According to the NRC, the plume exposure pathway EPZ generally extends approximately 10 miles (16 km) around a reactor site. Emergency plans within this area are designed to avoid or reduce radiation doses resulting from potential exposure pathways such as inhalation of radioactive particles. Protective actions include sheltering in place, evacuation, and the use of potassium iodide tablets when appropriate. The ingestion pathway EPZ extends approximately 50 miles from the reactor site. Protective actions within this area are intended to avoid or reduce radiation doses resulting from the consumption of contaminated food and water and may include restrictions on the use of affected food and water supplies. See also: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Emergency Planning Zones (28 August 2024), https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/emerg-preparedness/about-emerg-preparedness/planning-zones.html.
[58] Emergency preparedness is defined by the NRC as the programs, plans, training, exercises, and resources used to prepare for, promptly recognize, assess, and respond to emergency situations, including those arising from terrorist acts or natural phenomena such as hurricanes. See also: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Emergency Preparedness (EP)(15 February 2023), https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/emergency-preparedness-ep.html.
[65] United States Code, 42 U.S.C. §5841.
[82] Law on Atomic Energy 2025 (No. 94/2025/QH15), Article 8.
[83] Law on Atomic Energy 2025, Clause 1, Article 8.
[84] Law on Atomic Energy 2025, Point c, Clause 1, Article 10.
[85] Law on Atomic Energy 2025, Point b, Clause 2, Article 10.
[86] Law on Atomic Energy 2025, Clause 6, Article 36.
[87] Law on Atomic Energy 2025, Clause 1, Article 46.
[88] Law on Atomic Energy 2025, Clause 11, Article 4.
[89] Law on Atomic Energy 2025, Clause 3, Article 19.
[90] Law on Atomic Energy 2025, Clause 3, Article 19.
[91] Decision No. 153/QD-BKHCN dated 3 March 2025 of the Ministry of Science and Technology, Article 1.
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