Abstract: The article analyzes the legal nature of public assets from modern approaches in economics, public governance, and law, with a view to building a theoretical basis for identifying public assets from a multidimensional perspective. On that basis, the article assesses the current state of Vietnamese law on the management and use of public assets, identifying prominent issues related to information transparency, assessment of the efficiency of public asset use, inter-sectoral and inter-level coordination, and accountability in implementation. In the context where Viet Nam is accelerating the reorganization of administrative units, streamlining the state apparatus, and handling a large volume of redundant public assets, the correct identification of the legal nature of public assets becomes an important foundation for ensuring effective management and use, and for limiting the loss of public resources. From analyses of the shortcomings of the current legal regime, the article proposes five key groups of solutions to improve the institutional framework for public asset management, including: developing an integrated data system; establishing a framework of criteria for efficiency assessment; setting up inter-sectoral and inter-level coordination mechanisms; strengthening accountability and implementation capacity; and improving the legal framework in a coherent, modern, and adaptive direction. These solutions are expected to contribute to enhancing the effectiveness of public asset governance and optimizing the exploitation of public resources in the new period.
Keywords: Public assets; Legal nature; Public asset governance; Transparency and accountability; Inter-sectoral and inter-level coordination mechanisms; Improvement of the legal framework
Introduction
In the modern socio-economic structure, public assets play the role of essential material resources serving the operation of the State, the provision of public services, and the assurance of social welfare. The effectiveness of public asset management therefore not only reflects the capacity of public governance, but is also closely associated with the level of integrity of the state apparatus and social trust in the exercise of public power.
In Viet Nam, the Law on Management and Use of Public Assets 2017 (No. 15/2017/QH14), adopted by the National Assembly on 21 June 2017 (hereinafter referred to as the Law on Management and Use of Public Assets 2017), has established a unified legal framework for public asset management, approaching many modern standards of public governance. However, practical developments in recent years - particularly in the context of administrative unit reorganization, streamlining of the apparatus, and consolidation of state agencies during the 2019–2025 period - have given rise to numerous new issues relating to the handling of surplus assets, the efficiency of public asset use, and the accountability of managing entities.
Although there have been many studies on public asset management, most existing research approaches the issue from the perspective of legal techniques or administrative management, while failing to sufficiently clarify the relationship between the legal nature of public assets and the system of principles and mechanisms of public asset governance in the context of state apparatus reform. This gap has led to situations in which proposed solutions for improving the law sometimes lack a coherent theoretical foundation.
Against this background, the article focuses on analyzing the legal nature of public assets based on an interdisciplinary approach, thereby assessing the degree to which Vietnamese law aligns with modern principles of public asset governance and proposing solutions for improving the institutional framework for public asset management in the current period.
I. Theoretical foundations of public assets from modern economics, public governance, and law
1.1. Conceptions of public assets from public goods theory
In modern economics, public goods theory is regarded as an important foundation for explaining why certain types of assets must be managed by the State or the community rather than by the market. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP), public goods are defined as goods that are “both non-excludable and non-rivalrous in consumption”[1]. This means that no one can be prevented from using a public good, and one person’s use does not diminish the ability of others to use it.
Also according to the SEP’s analysis, these two characteristics generate significant economic consequences: markets lack incentives to provide such goods due to the “free-rider” problem (benefiting without paying costs), and as a result the private sector tends to underprovide or provide them inefficiently[2]. This explains why the State is commonly assigned the role of ensuring the provision of public goods, including assets or services associated with common interests such as security, basic infrastructure, transportation systems, or public spaces. Accordingly, from the perspective of public goods theory, public assets are understood as a category of assets with distinctive economic characteristics - characteristics that make their management, provision, and maintenance dependent on non-market mechanisms, most notably the governance role of the State or of organized communities.
1.2. Conceptions of public assets from common-pool resources theory
An important approach to explaining public assets in modern economic–legal scholarship derives from common-pool resources (CPR) theory, developed by Elinor Ostrom in her seminal work Governing the Commons (1990). According to Ostrom, CPR are resources that are “difficult to exclude” and “rivalrous (subtractable) in use”[3]. These two characteristics distinguish CPR from pure public goods: the extraction of CPR by one individual reduces the amount remaining for the community, while at the same time it is difficult for the community to prevent others from continuing to exploit them. Ostrom points out that resources such as common forests, fisheries, irrigation systems, grazing lands, or groundwater aquifers all possess CPR characteristics[4]. These are assets that are ill-suited to free-market mechanisms, because without appropriate management institutions they are prone to fall into the “tragedy of the commons,” leading to overexploitation and depletion. However, Ostrom argues that CPR do not necessarily have to be managed entirely by the State or privatized. On the contrary, many local communities are capable of developing shared rules, monitoring systems, and internal sanctions to govern CPR in a sustainable manner[5].
The CPR approach therefore provides a theoretical foundation for understanding that a segment of public assets in modern law consists precisely of resources of the CPR type - namely, assets of common value that are vulnerable to overexploitation in the absence of regulatory mechanisms. This perspective helps explain why assets such as public land, public water bodies, natural forests, or public spaces are classified as public assets and must be regulated by specific management principles aimed at ensuring sustainability and the common interests of the community.
1.3. Conceptions of public assets from the perspective of new public governance and modern sate governance
The transformation of state administration since the late twentieth century, particularly with the emergence of the New Public Management (NPM) model, has brought about significant changes in perceptions of public assets. Christopher Hood argues that NPM is based on core principles such as an emphasis on efficiency, the introduction of competition into the public sector, output-oriented management, and enhanced accountability[6]. When applied to the field of public assets, NPM requires that public assets be regarded as economic resources of the State, to be governed with a view to maximizing value and efficiency of use, rather than merely serving a passive role in administrative operations.
According to Osborne and Gaebler, the modern State needs to shift from a model of “rowing” to one of “steering,” meaning a transition from directly carrying out all activities to assuming a role of facilitation, coordination, and institution-building[7]. From the perspective of public assets, this view opens the way for the use of more diverse governance instruments - such as the socialization of public assets, public–private partnerships (PPP), and competitive bidding for the operation or exploitation of public assets - in order to enhance efficiency and reduce budgetary burdens.
Alongside NPM, the model of modern state governance (Good Governance), promoted by the United Nations and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)[8], emphasizes core principles such as transparency, accountability, integrity, public participation, and evidence-based governance[9]. When applied to public asset governance, Good Governance requires the public disclosure of asset inventories, transparency in allocation and disposition, the existence of independent oversight mechanisms, and the assurance that all decisions relating to public assets are accountable to society.
The OECD further identifies that public asset governance should be conducted in accordance with a life-cycle asset management approach, encompassing planning, investment, operation, maintenance, and disposal of assets[10]. This approach aims to optimize the long-term value of public assets, prevent losses, and ensure fiscal sustainability - an increasingly important requirement for states in the context of rising budgetary pressures and strong demands for public sector reform.
Accordingly, through the lens of NPM and Good Governance, public assets are no longer viewed merely as instruments for the functioning of the state apparatus, but are approached as a strategic asset portfolio requiring effective, transparent, and accountable governance in line with the requirements of the modern State.
1.4. Conceptions of public assets from the perspective of modern public law
In modern law, public assets are perceived as assets owned in common by the community, with the State acting as the representative exercising ownership rights and organizing their management in order to serve the public interest. This approach is clearly reflected in the laws of many countries around the world.
In France, the General Code on Public Property (adopted under Ordinance No. 2006-460 of 21 April 2006) provides that public property consists of two major groups: public property forming part of the domaine public (special public property - namely assets serving public interests or associated with public services), and public property used for the management purposes of public entities. Assets belonging to the domaine public are afforded special legal protection and may not be disposed of or privatized unless they undergo a statutory procedure of reclassification as prescribed by law[11].
In the United States, the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act 1949 provides that the federal government manages all federally owned property, including land, office buildings, equipment, and other assets serving public activities. This Act has been recodified in Title 40 of the United States Code and remains in force[12]. The law assigns the General Services Administration (GSA) authority to manage, allocate, maintain, and dispose of public property in order to ensure efficiency and economy.
In Asia, Japan has a relatively well-developed legal framework governing public assets. The National Property Act(enacted in 1948 and currently in force) defines categories of state-owned property, including national land, government office buildings, public works, and assets serving public services[13]. The Act establishes principles for public asset governance oriented toward proper use, preservation of value, efficiency, and the maintenance of public order. While the Japanese State is vested with the power to dispose of public assets, such powers must be exercised within the legal framework and for public purposes.
Consistent with the general trend in the laws of many countries, Vietnamese law also defines public assets as assets under ownership by the entire people, with the State acting as the representative owner and exercising unified management. The Constitution 2013 clearly provides that: “Land, water resources, mineral resources, resources in sea areas and airspace, other natural resources, and property invested in and managed by the State are public assets under ownership by the entire people”[14].
The Law on Management and Use of Public Assets 2017 further concretizes this concept. Article 3 of the Law identifies categories of public assets, including: assets serving the operation of state agencies; infrastructure assets; assets of the armed forces; assets in which ownership by the entire people is established; and public assets at state-owned enterprises. Article 6 of the Law sets out important management principles such as use for proper purposes; thrift and efficiency; publicity and transparency; preservation and development of public assets; and accountability in management and use.
The approach adopted by Vietnamese law, in line with that of many other countries, demonstrates that public assets are a category of assets closely associated with public interests and must be governed within the framework of public law, ensuring efficiency, transparency, and service to the common interests of society.
II. Identifying the legal nature of public assets
From four theoretical lenses - public goods, common-pool resources, public governance, and modern public law - the legal nature of public assets may be identified through the following aspects:
First, in terms of ownership: public assets are assets of the community, with the State acting merely as a representative subject
Public assets, by their nature, belong to the community and are not the private property of any organization or individual. The State is assigned by the Constitution the role of representative owner, exercising the rights of possession, use, and disposition on behalf of the entire people, rather than owning the assets in the sense applicable to private subjects. This creates a fundamental distinction between public assets and private assets: while private owners enjoy full rights of disposition within the framework of civil law, the State, as a representative of the community, is constrained by public law standards, principles of transparency and accountability, and limits on its powers of disposition. It is precisely this representative nature that gives rise to requirements for social oversight and the control of power in public asset governance.
Second, in terms of purpose: public assets are established and exist to serve the common interest
The purpose of public assets is not to pursue private gain or to satisfy the particular interests of a specific group of subjects, but to serve the essential interests of society such as security, national defense, education, healthcare, transportation, public welfare, and the operation of the state apparatus. This is the core criterion distinguishing public assets from private assets: private assets may be used to maximize individual benefits, whereas public assets are invariably associated with public interests, social interests, or public missions[15]. This “community-oriented” nature requires that the use of public assets strictly comply with purposes established by law; any misuse constitutes an infringement of public interests and is subject to stringent legal regulation.
Third, in terms of economic characteristics: public assets bear the features of public goods or common-pool resources
From an economic perspective, many types of public assets are non-excludable and non-rivalrous (characteristics of public goods), or difficult to exclude but rivalrous (characteristics of common-pool resources). These features make public assets prone to overuse, inefficient exploitation, or appropriation in the absence of state regulation. State involvement in public asset governance therefore goes beyond administrative management, aiming also to correct market failures and ensure the sustainability of shared resources. This is also why public assets must be governed through specific legal mechanisms and cannot be regulated entirely according to market logic as is the case with private assets.
Fourth, in terms of governance mechanisms: public assets are subject to public law and the principle of accountability
Unlike private assets, which are primarily governed by civil law, public assets are managed under public law, requiring high levels of transparency, publicity, oversight, and accountability on the part of state authorities. Decisions concerning the allocation, leasing, change of use, disposal, or exploitation of public assets must be grounded in legal provisions, subject to audit and inspection by competent authorities, and accountable to society. This public authority nature gives rise to the legal obligations of the State to preserve, develop, and use public assets in accordance with the objectives determined by law.
Fifth, in terms of position within national public finance: public assets constitute an important component of “public wealth”
Public assets not only serve the functioning of public authority but also constitute a significant component of national assets, reflecting a country’s financial capacity, material strength, and level of development. Many countries regard public assets as a key element of the public sector balance sheet, directly affecting fiscal sustainability, public debt management, and the capacity to provide public services. Accordingly, public asset governance is not merely a matter of administrative technique but a component of fiscal policy, requiring comprehensive life-cycle management approaches that emphasize maintenance, valuation, performance assessment, and the prevention of losses of national assets.
III. Fundamental principles governing the management and use of public assets as viewed from the legal nature of public assets
The principles governing public asset management are not merely mechanically enumerated rules, but are the inevitable outcomes derived from the very legal nature of public assets. Once public assets are identified as assets owned by the community, serving the public interest, bearing the characteristics of public goods or common-pool resources, and governed by public law, the system of principles for public asset governance must fully reflect these attributes. It is evident that public asset governance cannot be confined to the technical notion of “preservation and use,” but must adhere to a set of guiding and binding principles applicable to the State. These principles stem from the distinctive position of public assets within the legal order and public finance, and they articulate “what the State must do and how it must do so” when intervening in public assets.
First, the principle of prioritizing the public interest in all decisions relating to public assets: Recognizing that public assets are intrinsically linked to the common interest, this principle requires that every decision concerning public asset governance be subjected to a “public interest filter.” This means that, prior to deciding on the allocation, leasing, change of use, commercial exploitation, or disposal of public assets, the competent authority must demonstrate that the selected option yields greater social benefits, or at least does not diminish the public interest compared to the existing state. The principle of prioritizing the public interest also necessitates the use of impact assessment tools (for example, social impact assessment, environmental impact assessment, and budgetary impact assessment) as mandatory steps in decision-making on public assets, rather than relying solely on internal administrative needs.
The principle of prioritizing the public interest is widely recognized in international law and policies on public asset governance. In the United Kingdom, the Managing Surplus Government Property 2024 guidance issued by the Cabinet Office clearly states that “the objective remains to achieve the best benefit from government property for the public benefit.” This guidance particularly emphasizes that, when dealing with surplus public assets, achieving the highest sale price through the open market does not always deliver the greatest public benefit or best support policy implementation. Where multiple public sector bodies are interested in acquiring an asset, a multi-criteria assessment should be undertaken by the holding body to consider the relative merits of each option in terms of the public interest[16]. Similarly, in Australia, the Commonwealth Property Disposal Policy requires asset-managing agencies to consider “the benefit to the economy, community and/or environment from the proposed use,” as well as “the alignment of the proposal with government policy,” when deciding on the disposal of public assets[17]. From this perspective, the public interest is not merely a rhetorical concept, but becomes a legal and policy test applicable to all forms of state intervention in public assets.
Second, the principle of long-term public asset governance and preservation of service capacity. If the identification of legal nature shows that public assets constitute an important component of “public wealth,” then, as a matter of principle, the State must govern public assets with a vision extending beyond electoral cycles or short-term interests. This principle requires the formulation of medium- and long-term public asset management plans aligned with strategies for infrastructure development, public service provision, and national financial security. Rather than focusing exclusively on new investment, long-term governance obliges managing authorities to give equal attention to maintenance, upgrading, restructuring, and optimization of existing asset portfolios[18]. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), “maintenance needs to support the operation and planned lifespan of public infrastructure assets should be a fundamental consideration in investment decisions for such assets”[19]. Maintenance costs often account for a substantial proportion of the total cost of an infrastructure project over its life cycle, and therefore must be incorporated into cost–benefit analysis (CBA) from the investment appraisal stage[20].
Third, the principle of organizing public asset governance on the basis of transparency and accountability. If, from the perspective of legal nature, public assets are identified as objects governed by public law, then, as a matter of principle, public asset governance must be designed as a process that is visible, traceable, and open to questioning. Transparency and accountability in this context do not merely amount to the formal requirement of “information disclosure,” but entail the establishment of concrete mechanisms, including the disclosure of asset inventories, allocation criteria, exploitation contracts, transaction values, and the reasons for choosing particular methods of asset handling[21]. On that basis, managing authorities must be prepared to provide reasoned explanations to society for each significant decision relating to public assets, ranging from the selection of investors to the handling of surplus assets. When this principle is implemented substantively, it creates a legal space in which the press, citizens, elected bodies, and other oversight actors can effectively participate in scrutinizing public asset governance.
Fourth, the principle of using public assets in a manner that optimizes value and minimizes the risk of loss. The distinctive economic nature of public assets gives rise to the requirement that decisions on their use must optimize both use value and socio-economic value, while simultaneously limiting the risk of loss or dissipation. This principle does not imply that every public asset must be “commercialized to the maximum,” but rather requires the State to select modes of use that are proportionate to the function of each category of asset, based on a comparison among alternative usage scenarios. In many cases, leasing, joint ventures, partnerships, or public–private cooperation may generate greater value than leaving assets idle; however, such arrangements also carry the risk of transforming public assets into private benefits if the mechanisms for appraisal, selection, valuation, and contractual control are not sufficiently rigorous[22]. Accordingly, the principle of value optimization must always be accompanied by the design of risk-prevention mechanisms, ranging from appraisal procedures and independent valuation to oversight mechanisms and accountability for losses or irregularities. In addition, decisions on the disposition of public assets (such as sale, transfer, or assignment) must be assessed within the overall service capacity of the public asset system, avoiding reactive or short-term approaches that could result in the loss of resources that are difficult to regenerate in the future.
Fifth, the principle of controlling power in public asset governance and strengthening social oversight. The State’s role as the representative of ownership over public assets entails the risk of power concentration in the hands of certain agencies or individuals, which may in turn lead to abuse of power or the emergence of vested interests. The principle of power control in public asset governance requires the design of a multi-layered control structure, whereby decisions on significant public assets are not concentrated at a single level or within a single authority; major decisions must be subject to review, approval, or oversight by elected bodies, audit institutions, and inspection agencies; and sufficiently strong sanctions must be imposed on acts of abusing office for private gain derived from public assets[23]. In parallel, social oversight - through citizens, the press, professional associations, and social organizations - must be recognized as a constitutive element of the public asset governance system, rather than merely a supplementary activity. When information on public assets is opened, and society’s rights to question and provide feedback are respected, the principle of power control acquires genuine practical significance, contributing to the effective implementation of public asset law in practice.
IV. Assessing the extent to which Vietnamese law converges with modern principles of public asset governance
The Vietnamese legal system on public assets, with the Law on Management and Use of Public Assets 2017 as its cornerstone, has established a relatively comprehensive legal framework. However, when examined in comparison with the foundational principles of modern public asset governance - principles derived from the distinctive legal nature of public assets - it is possible to identify clear advances, while at the same time revealing notable gaps, both in legal design and in institutional implementation.
4.1. Issues relating to planning mechanisms and life-cycle management of public assets
Although the Law on Management and Use of Public Assets 2017 has set out certain basic requirements for long-term-oriented public asset management - such as asset record management, periodic inventory, maintenance of infrastructure assets (Articles 12 and 79), and the requirement of economical and efficient use (Article 6) - the current legal framework has yet to establish a comprehensive, unified, and integrated planning mechanism covering the entire life cycle of public assets. Provisions relating to planning are dispersed across multiple legal instruments in different sectors, resulting in a lack of interconnection in implementation and creating gaps in practice.
At the strategic level, Decree No. 45/2017/ND-CP provides for the formulation of five-year financial plans and three-year state financial–budgetary plans based on development strategies, master plans, development plans, and medium-term budget expenditure ceilings. Within this framework, expenditures related to investment, repair, maintenance, and disposal of public assets are considered as components of state budget expenditure, but have not been designed as an independent public asset management planning component linked to the asset life cycle. In sector-specific infrastructure fields, the existing system of guiding documents shows that Vietnamese law regulates in considerable detail individual categories of public assets. For example, with respect to market infrastructure assets, Article 13 of Decree No. 60/2024/ND-CP sets out a series of important management principles, including: full statistical recording and accounting of both physical assets and their values; depreciation and wear calculation; asset maintenance in accordance with regulations; ensuring transparency and publicity in management and exploitation; audit, inspection, and supervision; and recovery of land associated with assets where exploitation is ineffective or inconsistent with planning. These provisions reflect a relatively advanced life-cycle management approach, but they are confined to a specific category of assets rather than constituting a general mechanism applicable to all public assets. As a result, forecasting demand, identifying surplus or shortage of assets, and developing future exploitation or restructuring plans lack sufficiently strong legal tools to be implemented in a coordinated manner. Thus, notwithstanding significant progress in public asset management, planning mechanisms and life-cycle management of public assets in Viet Nam remain at a certain distance from the requirements of modern public governance, calling for further improvement in the coming period.
A noteworthy recent development in Vietnamese law is the issuance of Decision No. 213/QD-TTg (2024) approving the Scheme for a nationwide comprehensive inventory of public assets. This Scheme requires agencies, organizations, and units to conduct a comprehensive inventory of public assets, including infrastructure assets, special assets, office premises, and assets serving public service activities, and to report on their status, value, and conditions of use. However, this measure remains primarily a step toward collecting and standardizing input data, rather than a mandatory mechanism for transforming inventory results into medium- and long-term plans for the use, exploitation, maintenance, or disposal of public assets. Moreover, as the consolidated inventory report has not yet been published, there is currently no national dataset available to assess the level of readiness of ministries, sectors, and localities in formulating long-term plans based on inventory data.
4.2. Issues of transparency and accountability in the management and use of public assets
The Law on Management and Use of Public Assets 2017 establishes the principle of publicity and transparency in Article 8, which has been progressively specified through a series of decrees: from Decree No. 151/2017/ND-CP (providing the initial regulatory framework), through Decree No. 114/2024/ND-CP and Decree No. 50/2025/ND-CP (amending and supplementing relevant provisions), to Decree No. 186/2025/ND-CP of the Government detailing a number of articles of the Law on Management and Use of Public Assets, which took effect on 1 July 2025 and currently constitutes the most comprehensive implementing instrument. Decree No. 186/2025/ND-CP expands the scope of disclosure across four groups: formation of public assets; use and disposal; exploitation; and public infrastructure assets, with detailed provisions on disclosure items, timelines, and institutional responsibilities. This process of codification from 2017 to 2025 marks a significant step forward, transforming transparency from a general principle into a set of concrete legal obligations.
Nevertheless, this framework still exhibits notable limitations. First, there is no unified data integration mechanism: disclosed information is fragmented across multiple platforms (the Ministry of Finance, line ministries, People’s Committees at different levels, and on-site postings at individual units), making access difficult and preventing the formation of a single, coherent transparency database. Second, although Decree No. 186/2025/ND-CP specifies disclosure items in detail (Articles 104 and 105), it does not establish a mechanism for assessing the quality of disclosure - there are no indicators to measure completeness, timeliness, or accuracy - thus creating a risk that disclosure may become procedural rather than substantive. Third, disclosure obligations are imposed on institutions as entities, rather than being linked to the personal accountability of heads of agencies, which is a core condition for transparency to be effective in modern public governance. Finally, disclosure is structured by separate stages (formation – use – exploitation – disposal), without generating a continuous data flow, thereby limiting its usefulness for systemic analysis and evidence-based policy formulation.
Accordingly, while Decree No. 186/2025/ND-CP represents a major advance in terms of the scope and specificity of disclosure obligations, the public asset transparency regime still lacks two essential conditions: (i) an integrated, user-friendly data mechanism accessible to society; and (ii) a personal accountability mechanism for heads of agencies. These gaps need to be addressed in order for transparency to be implemented in a substantive manner, rather than remaining merely formal.
4.3. Issues relating to the lack of criteria for assessing efficiency and public value in the management and use of public assets
A key requirement of modern public asset governance is the establishment of a system of criteria for assessing the efficiency of public asset management and use, which serves as a basis for policy formulation, resource allocation, asset restructuring, and risk control. However, Vietnamese law has not yet developed such a set of criteria in a comprehensive and systematic manner.
The Law on Management and Use of Public Assets 2017 and Decree No. 186/2025/ND-CP require the disclosure of information on the formation, use, disposal, and exploitation of public assets, but these indicators are largely descriptive in nature, focusing on the status of assets (such as type of asset, quantity, original value, and residual value), rather than providing criteria for assessing effectiveness, such as the extent to which public service objectives are achieved, the rate of utilization compared with designed capacity, or the economic and social value created. As a result, even when reports contain extensive information, they still fail to reflect actual levels of effectiveness. For example, an asset may be reported as “in use”, yet there are no criteria to assess whether it is being used at appropriate capacity or in accordance with its legally defined purpose.
Decree No. 186/2025/ND-CP requires disclosure of forms of exploitation and revenues generated from public assets, but it lacks criteria for evaluating exploitation performance, such as the ratio of revenue to asset value or comparison with market benchmarks. This allows agencies to report that assets are “being exploited” and that “revenues are generated” without determining whether exploitation is efficient or whether assets are being undervalued. The absence of such criteria also undermines planning processes: medium- and long-term plans are formulated on the basis of needs, standards, and inventories, rather than on indicators of efficiency in asset use, resulting in investment decisions that are input-oriented rather than outcome-oriented. The consequences of this lack of efficiency assessment criteria have been clearly illustrated in several cases involving substantial losses of state resources. A notable example is the MobiFone case, in which 95% of the shares of AVG were acquired in 2015 for VND 8,889.815 billion, while the Government Inspectorate later determined the actual value of AVG to be approximately VND 1,983 billion, causing an estimated loss of around VND 7,006 billion. Investigation results showed that the investment decision lacked objective appraisal grounds, that valuation reports relied on unfounded input data, and that MobiFone made inaccurate and incomplete disclosures, failing to properly assess AVG’s poor financial condition[24]. Had a full and objective cost–benefit analysis (CBA), as required by modern public asset governance, been applied at the appraisal stage, this decision might have been prevented.
The absence of evaluation criteria also weakens oversight mechanisms. While the State Audit Office may conduct compliance audits, assessments of wastefulness or inefficiency largely depend on subjective judgments, due to the lack of standardized benchmarks. Thus, the core limitation of the current legal framework lies not in a lack of information - since Decree No. 186/2025/ND-CP already mandates extensive disclosure - but in the absence of a system of criteria for evaluating quality and effectiveness. Data transparency is a necessary condition, but it cannot substitute for performance indicators. Without such criteria, public asset management cannot effectively optimize resources, detect waste, assess accountability, or make informed restructuring decisions, representing a major bottleneck to improving public asset governance in the context of ongoing administrative reforms.
4.4. Issues relating to inter-sectoral and inter-level coordination in the management and use of public assets
Public asset management requires coordinated action among multiple actors, including the Ministry of Finance (as the central management authority), line ministries, People’s Committees at all levels, and inspection and audit bodies. However, inter-sectoral and inter-level coordination still suffers from significant shortcomings, which reduce management effectiveness and create overlaps in authority. These shortcomings are not merely theoretical, but have been demonstrated in practice through serious cases of loss. A notable example is the case of the Viet Nam Oil and Gas Group (PVN) contributing capital to OceanBank, in which PVN’s decision to invest was made beyond its authority and without approval by the Board of Directors, while cross-checking control mechanisms between the state capital management authority (the Ministry of Finance) and the sectoral regulator (the State Bank of Viet Nam) were insufficiently effective to prevent the decision in a timely manner[25]. This case illustrates that, in the absence of effective inter-sectoral coordination mechanisms, decisions concerning state assets or state capital may be taken in an “isolated” manner, lacking cross-control and thereby posing a high risk of significant losses.
Further analysis reveals specific gaps in the current legal framework governing coordination mechanisms, as follows.
First, the model of “functional dispersion” - under which the Ministry of Finance formulates policies and aggregates data, line ministries manage assets by sector, People’s Committees manage assets by locality, and agencies and units manage assets on site - while consistent with decentralization, lacks effective vertical and horizontal coordination mechanisms. The fact that multiple levels possess approval authority results in multi-layered “request–approval” procedures, causing delays and increasing compliance costs. Second, the administrative reorganization process during 2019–2025 exposed clear shortcomings in handling large volumes of surplus assets. The law provides only general principles and has not established mandatory inter-sectoral coordination mechanisms, leading to cycles of waiting between superior and subordinate levels. Third, inter-level coordination is hampered by the absence of data connectivity and unified standards. Public asset reports are prepared along vertical lines (from agencies to superior authorities and then to the Ministry of Finance), without mechanisms for horizontal data sharing among agencies at the same level. When asset transfers or joint management of shared infrastructure are required, each agency must collect information anew, prolonging timelines and increasing the risk of inaccuracies. Fourth, coordination among the State Audit Office, the Government Inspectorate, and ministerial inspectorates remains insufficiently harmonized; the lack of a unified mechanism leads to overlapping inspections while, at the same time, leaving supervision gaps. Finally, the law does not mandate inter-sectoral coordination in the formulation of medium- and long-term public asset management plans. Each ministry, sector, and locality prepares its own plans in isolation, resulting in a lack of coherence. Consequently, assets involving multiple sectors (such as transport infrastructure, irrigation systems, or cultural and sports facilities) fall into a situation of “overlapping management but dispersed responsibility,” causing investment decisions to be misaligned with sectoral strategies or overall planning.
Overall, shortcomings in inter-sectoral and inter-level coordination stem from three main causes: (i) fragmented authority without effective coordination mechanisms; (ii) insufficient data connectivity and information sharing among agencies; and (iii) the absence of an institution responsible for overall coordination in the field of public assets. These factors significantly undermine the effectiveness of public asset governance in an increasingly complex governance environment.
From the foregoing analysis, it can be seen that Vietnamese law on the management and use of public assets has gradually approached modern public asset governance principles in terms of legal design, particularly in establishing transparency requirements, allocating authority, and imposing obligations to manage and use public assets in a thrifty and efficient manner. However, the degree of practical convergence depends substantially on implementation conditions, including planning mechanisms, information systems, efficiency evaluation criteria, and the capacity for coordination among managing entities at different levels. In the context of administrative unit reorganization and state apparatus restructuring, public asset management in 2025 faces stringent requirements in terms of both timelines and coordination. From early 2025, the Ministry of Finance issued guiding documents and notices urging ministries, sectors, and localities to accelerate inventory-taking, classification, and the formulation of plans to handle surplus public assets, in order to ensure compliance with the law on public asset management and use[26]. According to consolidated information on the status of public asset handling as of 1 December 2025, nationwide authorities had processed 17,496 surplus housing and land facilities, equivalent to approximately 65.89% of the workload, while around 9,056 facilities remained under review and processing in accordance with established procedures[27]. These figures indicate that the implementation of public asset management law during the period of state apparatus reorganization is being carried out under conditions of a very large workload, requiring close coordination among managing entities and underscoring the need to further refine operational mechanisms to ensure that public asset governance principles are implemented effectively and in line with current administrative reform requirements
V. Solutions to enhance the effectiveness of public asset governance in Viet Nam
5.1. Improving the information system and the national database on public assets in an integrated, interoperable and decision-support-oriented manner
One of the foundational solutions to enhance the effectiveness of public asset management and use in the context of administrative reform and the reorganization of administrative units is to improve the information system and the national database on public assets in an integrated, interoperable and decision-support-oriented manner. This system not only constitutes a necessary condition for ensuring publicity and transparency as required by the Law on Management and Use of Public Assets 2017 and Decree No. 186/2025/ND-CP, but also serves as a prerequisite for addressing data fragmentation, insufficient inter-sectoral coordination, and the lack of effectiveness evaluation criteria, as analyzed in previous sections.
First, the public asset information system should be designed following a centralized database model, uniformly operated by the Ministry of Finance, while allowing ministries, sectors and localities to update data directly in real time. Integrating data in this manner would remedy the current situation in which information is dispersed across multiple platforms managed by different ministries, sectors and local authorities, which significantly constrains the capacity for retrieval, cross-checking and analysis. A unified database would also facilitate faster and more accurate report aggregation, reduce compliance costs, and minimize distortions arising from multi-level information transmission.
Second, the database system should ensure horizontal interoperability, enabling data sharing among ministries, ministerial-level agencies, Government-affiliated agencies and People’s Committees at all levels within their respective functions and competences. Although current legislation provides detailed regulations on reporting and disclosure obligations regarding public assets at each management level, it has not yet established mechanisms for data sharing among agencies at the same level or among functionally related agencies. Establishing such interoperability mechanisms would enhance proactiveness in handling, reallocating and exploiting public assets, particularly infrastructure assets or working offices involving multiple sectors and multiple levels of government.
Third, the national database on public assets should be expanded to integrate indicators on the effectiveness of public asset management and use, rather than being limited to descriptive data such as asset categories, quantities, original value, remaining value, or revenues derived from public asset exploitation. Only when such an indicator system is developed can management authorities assess the level of public asset utilization (proper purpose, capacity utilization), the effectiveness of financial resource exploitation (revenue-to-asset value ratios, alignment with market prices), and the extent to which public service objectives are met. This constitutes a prerequisite for linking public asset disclosure with accountability, thereby enhancing governance effectiveness and reducing waste.
Fourth, the database system should be developed in a manner that supports analysis, forecasting and policy formulation, rather than serving merely as a data storage tool. This requires the application of modern data governance technologies to enable the simulation of scenarios for the use, reallocation or disposal of public assets; the forecasting of surplus asset generation during administrative unit reorganization; or the assessment of the effectiveness of exploitation, joint venture or association schemes for specific asset categories. An information system with analytical capacity would assist public asset management authorities in transitioning from an administrative governance model to an evidence-based governance model, in line with international trends in public financial management.
Finally, for the database system to operate effectively, it is necessary to establish independent control and supervision mechanisms over data quality, update frequency and the completeness of information. Such mechanisms may include the public disclosure of data quality indicator sets, the clarification of responsibilities at each level for updating and standardizing information, and sufficiently strong legal sanctions against acts of delayed updating, inaccurate updating or deliberate concealment of information. This constitutes a condition for ensuring that data are not only formally complete, but also substantively valuable for the management, use and exploitation of public assets.
In summary, improving the information system and the national database on public assets in an integrated, interoperable and decision-support-oriented manner is an infrastructure-type solution that creates a foundation for the effective implementation of other solutions. International experience has also demonstrated the important role of integrated information systems in public governance; a notable example is the Republic of Korea, a country whose Digital Government Index is significantly higher than the OECD average, thereby reflecting the effective use of data and information systems to support decision-making in state management, including public asset management [28]. For Viet Nam, this should likewise be identified as an important starting point for ensuring transparency, strengthening accountability, and enhancing the effectiveness of public asset use in the context of state apparatus reform and the reorganization of administrative units at present.
5.2. Improving the system of criteria for evaluating efficiency and public value in the management and use of public assets
One of the foundational issues for enhancing the effectiveness of public asset governance at present is the development and refinement of a system of criteria for evaluating the efficiency and public value of public assets. Such evaluation is not only intended to measure the level of task performance of managing agencies and units, but also serves as a tool for risk control, rational resource allocation, and evidence-based policy decision-making. While current legislation has relatively comprehensively prescribed requirements on information disclosure and the contents of public asset management, a system of criteria for evaluating efficiency has yet to be clearly established. Therefore, improving this set of criteria constitutes a “leverage” condition for enhancing the effectiveness of public asset use, particularly in the context of administrative unit reorganization and the streamlining of the state apparatus at present.
First, it is necessary to develop a framework of criteria for evaluating the efficiency of public asset use that combines legal criteria, economic–financial criteria, and public value criteria. Legal criteria should measure compliance with standards, norms, and prescribed purposes of use; economic–financial criteria should assess the level of exploitation, cost–benefit performance, and asset efficiency; while public value criteria should reflect the extent to which assets serve social interests, community benefits, or contribute to the fulfillment of public functions. This multidimensional approach allows for an assessment not only of whether assets are used, but also how effectively they are used and what value they generate for society.
Second, a system of quantitative indicators should be established to evaluate the efficiency of public asset use and exploitation. These indicators may include, but are not limited to, the ratio of actual use to designed capacity; the ratio of financial returns to asset value; the level of cost savings compared with alternative options; or the degree to which public access to public services is enhanced. At present, reports prepared in accordance with Decree No. 186/2025/ND-CP mainly reflect descriptive information (such as original value, residual value, forms of exploitation, and revenues), rather than measuring efficiency or enabling comparison among different management options. Accordingly, incorporating quantitative indicators is necessary to clearly distinguish between “management in compliance with regulations” and “effective management.”
Third, it is necessary to establish a linkage mechanism between the results of efficiency evaluation and the process of formulating medium- and long-term plans on public assets at ministries, sectors, and localities. Currently, public asset management plans are largely based on existing conditions and projected future needs, without adequately reflecting the results of efficiency evaluations. Once a system of criteria is established, decisions on new investment, repair, upgrading, or disposal of public assets should be considered on the basis of prior efficiency performance. This helps prevent fragmented investment, unnecessary repairs, or the continued maintenance of assets that fail to generate public value.
Fourth, the system of efficiency evaluation criteria should be closely linked to accountability mechanisms. When each public asset is measured through specific indicators, heads of agencies and units are required to account for the causes of inefficient use, low capacity utilization, delayed handling, or failure to generate financial value. This represents an important step toward strengthening discipline and order in public asset management and reducing the prevalence of “collective responsibility,” which currently obscures individual accountability.
Finally, the system of efficiency evaluation criteria should be integrated into the national database on public assets, thereby enabling comparisons among agencies, units, and localities. When data are standardized and publicly disclosed, society can objectively supervise the efficiency of public asset use; at the same time, state management agencies can identify effective utilization models and replicate good practices. This constitutes the foundation for a modern, transparent public asset governance system oriented toward the optimization of public value.
In summary, improving the system of criteria for evaluating the efficiency and public value of public assets is not only aimed at addressing existing shortcomings, but also serves as the key to transforming public asset management from a “compliance–administrative” model to an “efficiency–results-based” governance model. This approach is consistent with the requirements of public governance reform, state apparatus streamlining, and the optimal mobilization of public asset resources in the current stage of development.
5.3. Establishing inter-sectoral and inter-level coordination mechanisms in the management, handling, and exploitation of public assets
Although the Law on Management and Use of Public Assets 2017 and Decree No. 186/2025/ND-CP have relatively clearly delineated the roles and responsibilities of each level involved in public asset management - from the Ministry of Finance, line ministries, and People’s Committees at all levels to agencies and units directly assigned to manage assets - the current legal framework has not yet fully established mechanisms for inter-sectoral and inter-level coordination. Existing regulations mainly specify “who does what,” but do not clearly indicate “how these actors must coordinate with one another” in situations that require the simultaneous involvement of multiple authorities. Therefore, in order to enhance the effectiveness of public asset governance, particularly in the context of handling redundant assets following the reorganization of administrative units, the establishment of inter-sectoral and inter-level coordination mechanisms constitutes an urgent requirement.
First, it is necessary to develop mandatory inter-sectoral coordination mechanisms for groups of public assets that concurrently involve multiple state authorities. While Decree No. 186/2025/ND-CP clearly defines the competencies of each authority, the separation of powers has resulted in approval procedures for plans on handling, reallocating, or repurposing public assets being frequently prolonged. A coordinating body - depending on the type of asset, which may be the Ministry of Finance, a line ministry, or a provincial-level People’s Committee - should be vested with powers to provide legal assistance, request information, convene inter-sectoral meetings, and issue recommendations with binding value in order to unify procedures for public asset handling.
Second, a unified inter-level coordination process should be established for key stages such as inventory taking, asset valuation, and the formulation of plans for the use or disposal of public assets. At present, guiding documents only prescribe the responsibilities of each level separately, without setting out an integrated coordination roadmap among relevant actors. In complex situations, such as the handling of redundant assets following administrative unit mergers or the restructuring of the state apparatus, the absence of an inter-level process leads to a “waiting-for-each-other” situation, thereby prolonging asset handling and increasing management costs.
Third, it is necessary to establish data coordination mechanisms among public asset management authorities. Although Decree No. 186/2025/ND-CP prescribes responsibilities for disclosure, reporting, and data updating at each level, it has not established mandatory mechanisms for horizontal information sharing among competent authorities. In a context where public assets are increasingly complex and often involve multiple localities or sectors, data-sharing mechanisms constitute a critical condition for accelerating decision-making and ensuring that handling plans are formulated on the basis of complete, accurate, and consistent information.
Fourth, coordination mechanisms should be strengthened in supervision, inspection, and auditing activities. Currently, the State Audit Office of Viet Nam, the Government Inspectorate, ministerial inspectorates, and local inspectorates each have certain competencies in supervising the management and use of public assets, but there is no unified coordination mechanism to avoid overlaps or omissions. In the absence of clear allocation of inspection roles, inspected entities may be subject to multiple inspection teams addressing the same issues, while critical areas remain insufficiently supervised. A coordinated supervision mechanism would enhance inspection effectiveness, reduce compliance costs, and enable the timely detection of management risks.
Finally, for inter-sectoral and inter-level coordination mechanisms to be effective, it is necessary to establish mechanisms for assessing both individual and institutional responsibility in the coordination process. When the handling or reallocation of public assets is delayed or fails to achieve intended results, the legal system should be able to clearly identify which authority bears responsibility and at which stage bottlenecks arise. This not only strengthens administrative discipline and order, but also creates incentives for authorities to proactively coordinate and minimize risks in public asset management.
The establishment of inter-sectoral and inter-level coordination mechanisms is therefore a crucial solution for addressing existing institutional gaps. This solution aims to fill deficiencies in implementation mechanisms and to lay the groundwork for unified, effective public asset management that meets practical demands in the current phase of state apparatus reform.
5.4. Strengthening accountability and enhancing implementation capacity in the management and use of public assets
Accountability and implementation capacity constitute two decisive factors determining the effectiveness of public asset governance. Accordingly, strengthening accountability and enhancing implementation capacity represent a human–organizational solution, serving as a necessary complement to institutional, data-related, and inter-sectoral coordination reforms.
First, it is necessary to strengthen the personal accountability of heads of agencies, organizations, and units in the management, use, and handling of public assets. At present, legal regulations mainly require agencies and units to disclose information, prepare reports, or formulate plans for the use of public assets, but rarely specify individual responsibility when these obligations are not fulfilled on time or are carried out inaccurately. Therefore, the legal framework should be supplemented with sanctioning mechanisms that directly link the responsibility of heads of agencies to public asset management outcomes, particularly in cases where assets are left idle, used inefficiently, or subject to prolonged delays in handling without objective impediments. Such mechanisms would contribute to enhancing proactiveness and reducing risk-averse attitudes in public asset handling.
Second, it is necessary to improve the professional capacity of public asset management units within agencies, organizations, and local authorities. Public asset management is a complex field requiring integrated knowledge of law, public finance, risk management, asset valuation, and data techniques. However, in many agencies, public asset management functions are performed on a part-time basis or by personnel lacking specialized expertise, resulting in reports and asset handling plans that fail to meet required standards. Accordingly, regular training programs should be established to enhance professional capacity, while greater application of supporting technologies should be promoted to reduce human resource pressures and improve implementation quality.
Third, incentive mechanisms linked to performance outcomes should be developed for the handling, exploitation, and cost-saving management of public assets. In many cases, “not handling” redundant assets entails fewer risks than proactively proposing handling solutions, leading managing agencies to opt for safe but inefficient approaches that undermine public asset effectiveness. Therefore, the legal framework should incorporate incentive mechanisms, such as recognizing effective public asset handling outcomes in performance evaluations or allowing a reasonable portion of revenue generated from asset handling to be retained for reinvestment, thereby encouraging proactive behavior by managing agencies.
Fourth, internal inspection and supervision systems should be established for tasks related to public asset management. Such systems must ensure a relative degree of independence from units directly managing assets, in order to detect violations at an early stage, provide risk warnings, and support heads of agencies in their managerial functions. When internal supervision mechanisms are properly positioned, agencies and units will gain an additional channel for risk control, reduce formalistic reporting, and strengthen implementation discipline.
Finally, the application of information technology throughout the entire public asset management process should be intensified. This includes the use of digital signatures, electronic processing workflows, electronic public asset registers, and tools for monitoring asset handling progress. Technology not only reduces administrative burdens but also enhances transparency, minimizes risks of manual intervention, and supports real-time monitoring of accountability. This constitutes a critical foundation for transitioning from manual management models to modern, data-driven governance models.
Strengthening accountability and enhancing implementation capacity is therefore a human–organizational solution with decisive significance for the effectiveness of the entire public asset management system. When heads of agencies bear clear responsibilities, management units possess adequate capacity, incentive mechanisms are in place, and technology is widely applied, the management, use, and exploitation of public assets can achieve higher levels of effectiveness, meeting the requirements of contemporary public governance reform.
5.5. Improving the legal framework and institutional arrangements for public asset management in a coherent, modern, and reform-adaptive manner
Public asset management lies at the intersection of multiple branches of law, including state budget law, land law, public investment law, public property law, and the law on the organization of the state apparatus. Therefore, in order to enhance the effectiveness of public asset governance, alongside solutions relating to data, coordination, and accountability, improving the legal framework and institutional arrangements for public asset management in a coherent and modern direction plays a pivotal role. This constitutes a foundational solution aimed at ensuring policy consistency, resolving legal conflicts, enhancing predictability, and facilitating effective implementation by relevant actors.
First, a comprehensive review of the system of legal normative documents relating to public assets is required to ensure coherence and consistency between the Law on Management and Use of Public Assets 2017 and other relevant laws, such as the Land Law, the Law on the State Budget, the Law on Public Investment, the Law on Construction, and laws governing the management and use of public assets in specialized sectors. It is necessary to clearly identify the “primary governing law” and the “supplementary applicable laws” for each category of public assets, while amending provisions that are contradictory or create obstacles in practice.
Second, a dedicated legal framework should be developed for public assets arising from the rearrangement of administrative units and the restructuring of the state apparatus. This category of assets is characterized by distinctive features: large scale, uneven spatial distribution, inclusion of offices, infrastructure works, and land-attached assets, and emergence within a short period of time. Existing legislation currently provides only general principles for handling redundant assets (such as those set out in Article 12 of Resolution No. 76/2025/UBTVQH15), but lacks specialized procedures for inventory, valuation, formulation of use plans, and reallocation of assets following administrative mergers. The promulgation of a specific legal framework would help shorten processing time, mitigate risks of loss, and ensure that public assets are optimally allocated in accordance with the new functional mandates of the administrative apparatus.
Third, financial exploitation mechanisms for public assets should be refined in a flexible manner consistent with the principle of “controlled exploitation” without diminishing public value. Mechanisms relating to leasing, joint ventures, partnerships, or the use of public assets for business purposes should be supplemented with clear criteria regarding partner selection, asset valuation, risk-sharing arrangements, and cash-flow management methods. The objective is to enable the mobilization of resources from public assets to increase budget revenues or support reinvestment, while ensuring transparency, preventing rent-seeking and group interests, and preserving the public service function of such assets.
Fourth, administrative procedures in the management, use, and handling of public assets should be revised and simplified, particularly in cases involving the transfer of offices, conversion of asset functions, or liquidation of assets no longer in use. The principle of “one process – one focal point” should be applied in order to reduce processing time and improve efficiency, while a unified legal interpretation mechanism should be established to minimize inconsistent understandings and applications across different localities and agencies.
Finally, improving the institutional framework for public asset management must be situated within the broader context of digital transformation and the modernization of state governance. The legal framework should provide a sufficient enabling environment for the application of technology in public asset management, including digital signatures, digitization of asset records, public asset identification through QR codes, digital mapping systems for land-attached assets, and technologies for monitoring asset life cycles. These elements are essential for building a modern, transparent, and data-driven public property governance platform.
Improving the legal framework and institutional arrangements for public asset management in a coherent, modern, and adaptive manner is therefore a comprehensive and long-term solution. This approach not only addresses the immediate shortcomings of the existing legal system but also orients the development of a public asset governance model that is aligned with the requirements of state apparatus reform, promotes sustainable development, and enhances public value in the new development stage.
Conclusion
Public asset management is a long-term challenge for the State in safeguarding common resources and ensuring public value. The analyses in this article demonstrate that the requirement for reform lies not only in improving legal regulations, but more importantly in enhancing the quality of implementation and designing effective operational mechanisms. Modern theoretical approaches provide clearer insight into the distinctive legal nature of public assets, thereby giving rise to governance requirements that are suited to the new context. The realization of the proposed solutions requires commitment from the entire system and coherence in organizational implementation. When these elements are harmonized, public assets will truly become an important foundation of national governance and sustainable development.
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