Abstract: Nowadays, childbirth through assisted reproductive technology (ART) has become increasingly prevalent, meeting the practical needs of infertile couples, single women, or individuals in special circumstances - such as those with terminal illnesses seeking to preserve genetic material for future reproductive plans. However, the advancement of biomedicine has also brought about complex legal disputes regarding the rights to cryopreserved embryos when couples decide to terminate their marriage. Current Vietnamese law lacks a specific legal framework to promptly regulate practical issues that may arise concerning frozen embryos upon the termination of marriage. Therefore, this article approaches the issue by analyzing international experiences regarding the legal status of cryopreserved embryos in relation to the rights and obligations of spouses upon divorce in several countries. Through this analysis, the article clarifies potential practical issues to suggest directions for perfecting Vietnamese law, aiming to harmonize bioethics and reproductive freedom in modern family life. Additionally, it seeks to protect the legitimate rights and interests of spouses as well as children born from cryopreserved embryos.
Keywords:Frozen embryos; embryo disputes; termination of marriage; determination of father, mother, child; assisted reproduction.
INTRODUCTION
The development of assisted reproductive technologies has significantly expanded the ability to exercise reproductive rights, while simultaneously giving rise to new legal issues that extend beyond the traditional regulatory framework of marriage and family law. Among these, cryopreserved embryos represent a distinctive subject, existing at the intersection between a biological entity and a legal object, and directly associated with personal rights and the reproductive intentions of individuals. In Viet Nam, the current legal system primarily approaches cryopreserved embryos from an administrative and medical management perspective, while failing to clearly establish their legal status as well as mechanisms for resolving disputes arising upon the termination of marriage. This gap not only creates difficulties in the practical application of the law but also affects reproductive autonomy and the fundamental values of bioethics. In this context, studying cryopreserved embryos from a legal perspective has become an urgent requirement in order to establish a theoretical foundation for the improvement of Vietnamese law in this field.
I. Identification of Cryopreserved Embryos and Their Legal Classification
The remarkable advancement of assisted reproductive technologies in Viet Nam since 1998, particularly in vitro fertilization (IVF), has brought hope to millions of infertile couples. However, alongside medical success, IVF has also given rise to numerous legal issues surrounding the resolution of disputes over cryopreserved embryos upon the termination of marriage.
From a biological perspective, a cryopreserved embryo (frozen embryo) is the result of a successful combination between male gametes (sperm) and female gametes (oocytes) in a laboratory environment. Instead of being transferred immediately as a fresh embryo during the IVF cycle, these embryos are frozen and stored at extremely low temperatures to maintain their potential viability[1].
From a legal perspective, the classification of cryopreserved embryos is one of the most controversial issues facing legal systems worldwide. Legal history records some of the earliest debates on this issue dating back to 1981, involving a case in which an Australian couple died in an airplane accident, leaving behind two frozen embryos at a clinic in Los Angeles. This incident created a major divide in global legal thinking: one view regarded embryos as equivalent to fetuses, requiring protection of the right to life through surrogacy[2]; the other argued that embryos constituted part of an estate, thereby allowing heirs to dispose of them as ordinary property[3]. However, due to the absence of clear consent regarding their intended use and genetic constraints, the embryos were ultimately destroyed, leaving a significant gap in determining the legal status of cryopreserved embryos.
To identify embryos from the perspective of civil law, it is first necessary to analyze their biological nature and specific storage conditions. An embryo is a unique entity that contains a complete genetic code and the potential to develop into a distinct individual. However, when not located within the mother’s body and instead preserved in cryogenic conditions at minus 196 degrees Celsius[4], the embryo becomes an object that can be physically controlled, stored, and transferred. Modern technology allows embryos to remain viable for up to 50 years, creating the possibility of reproduction across time, even after the biological parents have passed away[5]. It is precisely this characteristic of “separation” and “storability” that provides the basis for applying property-related legal regimes to cryopreserved embryos.
In essence, there are three ethical perspectives that courts have recognized when attempting to determine the rights associated with gamete donors and cryopreserved embryos. Cryopreserved embryos have been described by some as “life,” by others as “property,” while a third view considers them to fall within an intermediate category between life and property.
First view, the doctrine that regards frozen embryos as life is grounded in the moral belief that any entity possessing a unique genetic code deserves state protection[6]. In the landmark case Davis v. Davis (1992), the Tennessee trial court rejected purely biological concepts to affirm that frozen embryos are “children in vitro,” thereby applying the doctrine of parens patriae (the state’s protective authority over those incapable of self-protection) to prioritize the right of the embryo to be born.
In stark contrast to the above approach, the second view regards frozen embryos as objects of property rights[7]. In the United States, although legal regulations are fragmented across different states, the most commonly applied model is the “contractual approach.” Under this approach, embryos are treated as a special form of joint property, and their fate is determined by agreements between the parties and the IVF clinic. The case York v. Jones (1989)[8] is a typical example in which the court applied the doctrine of bailment[9] to hold that embryos are genetic material owned by the providers of the gametes, thereby establishing a relationship between patients and medical facilities in the form of a “bailor” and “bailee.” Characterizing embryos as property has the advantage of providing clarity in the enforcement of medical service contracts and eliminating state interference in individual autonomy. However, it raises ethical concerns by reducing an entity with potential for life to the same level as ordinary tissues or cells.
Nevertheless, modern legal practice is gradually shifting toward an intermediate position, viewing frozen embryos as a special entity situated between life and property, deserving of “special respect” due to their potential to become human beings[10]. Rather than applying rigid definitions, courts now prioritize resolving disputes through balancing constitutional rights and examining the “clear intent” of the parties as expressed in prior agreements. The intent-based doctrine, reinforced in cases such as Johnson v. Calvert (1993)[11] and Hecht v. Superior Court (1993)[12], affirms that the initial intention of the parties serves as the guiding principle for determining parentage and the right to control genetic material. The United Kingdom follows this approach through the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (HFE Act). The Act provides that a frozen embryo is a live human embryo but does not fully equate it with either a “person” or “property,” instead assigning it a special legal status linked to the principle of ongoing consent[13] and limitations on storage duration[14].
Similarly, in China, although the Civil Code of 2020 does not contain provisions directly defining the legal status of embryos, judicial practice and academic discourse have developed a distinct approach by treating embryos as a form of “special property with attributes of life and implications of personality” (a special property of life attributes and personality implications). That is, in legal terms, embryos are not recognized as “persons” or independent subjects of civil rights. Under Article 13 of the Civil Code of the People’s Republic of China 2020, a natural person’s capacity for civil rights arises only upon live birth and terminates upon death. Although Article 16 provides an exception granting the fetus limited civil capacity to protect interests such as inheritance or receipt of gifts, this provision does not apply retroactively to the embryonic stage. Furthermore, the law permitting embryo destruction by agreement[15] or the use of surplus embryos for scientific research after anonymization (in accordance with bioethical guidelines)[16] rejects the absolute right to life of embryos as legal subjects. However, embryos cannot be entirely equated with ordinary property. Under Article 115, although embryos possess certain attributes of property (being tangible, separable from the donor’s body, controllable, and capable of satisfying human needs), they are strictly constrained by Article 1007, which prohibits the commercialization of human cells and tissues. Therefore, unlike ordinary property, embryos cannot be bought, sold, mortgaged, or disposed of entirely at the discretion of the parties for profit. Instead, embryos are recognized as having strong personal implications for two fundamental reasons: (1) they contain unique genetic information closely tied to reproductive rights and human dignity of the embryo creators under Article 109 and Article 990(2); (2) they constitute “special objects with personal significance” under Article 1183(2), allowing the donor to claim compensation for non-pecuniary damage if the embryo is unlawfully infringed or destroyed.
From the analysis and comparison of different perspectives on the legal status of frozen embryos, the third approach not only helps protect the right to reproductive freedom but also establishes a humane mechanism for resolving conflicts, recognizing that although the destruction of embryos constitutes a significant loss, it may be a necessary cost to safeguard individual autonomy and the integrity of human relationships in a rule-of-law society. Forcing embryos into one of the two traditional categories (thing or person) is legally strained. Embryos should instead be recognized as a “sui generis legal entity.” Accordingly, they require a hybrid protective mechanism: regulated as property in terms of physical control, but respected as having personal rights in terms of disposition.
In the context of Vietnamese law, this issue currently presents a significant legal gap. Under Clause 5, Article 2 of Government Decree No. 10/2015 (Government Decree (GD), as amended and supplemented by Government Decree No. 98/2016 (Government Decree (GD)), only a definition of embryo is provided: “An embryo is the product of the combination of an ovum and a sperm,” without any provision on frozen embryos. This definition is more technical and medical in nature rather than establishing legal status, thereby leading to conflicts in perception among different legal subfields, specifically:
Regarding personal rights and the right to self-determination. Under Article 21 of Government Decree No. 10/2015 (Government Decree (GD), as amended and supplemented by Government Decree No. 98/2016 (Government Decree (GD)), the fate of embryos (storage, donation, or destruction) depends entirely on the consent of the married couple or the depositor. Notably, the law anticipates and protects the rights of the surviving party in the event that one party dies: embryos shall not be destroyed if the husband or wife submits a request and continues to maintain storage fees. This shows that personal rights over embryos have been extended beyond the conventional biological scope, becoming a form of legal entitlement closely linked to the intention to become parents.
Regarding the mechanism of protection through contractual and administrative liability regimes. In practice, the relationship between married couples and medical facilities has been established based on a “civil contract” model for storage and preservation (Article 20 of Government Decree No. 10/2015 (Government Decree (GD), as amended and supplemented by Government Decree No. 98/2016 (Government Decree (GD)). To ensure the enforcement of such agreements, Government Decree No. 117/2020 (Government Decree (GD)) has established a system of strict administrative sanctions. The existence of these contractual mechanisms and administrative sanctions indicates that Vietnamese law has indirectly recognized the control rights and lawful interests of subjects over frozen embryos within a specific legal relationship framework.
However, this situation reveals deep internal contradictions between legal classification and actual implementation. On the one hand, the law treats embryos as objects of personal rights (non-pecuniary, closely linked to individuals); on the other hand, it regulates embryo storage through a paid bailment relationship with compensation, which are purely characteristics of property relations.
The lack of consistency in the legal approach to frozen embryos leads to significant legal risks in dispute resolution. While family law emphasizes reproductive rights and the will of the parties, civil law has not yet recognized embryos as objects of property rights, and relevant legal instruments primarily regulate embryos from a technical management perspective. This inconsistency increases legal risks when disputes arise, particularly in cases where medical facilities lose or damage embryos due to technical errors, making it difficult for courts to determine the legal basis and scope of appropriate liability. In addition, Clause 2, Article 21 of Government Decree No. 10/2015 (Government Decree (GD)) establishes a mechanism for handling the situation where one spouse dies (prioritizing the right of disposition of the surviving spouse), but this regulation leaves open the case where both spouses die, as frozen embryos are not clearly legally defined; therefore, the rights to store and use embryos cannot be transferred to the first-order heirs of the couple (such as paternal or maternal grandparents). In such a situation, according to the author, the failure to clearly define the legal nature of frozen embryos leads to interpretations that are not entirely convincing in legal practice. Frozen embryos cannot be regarded as “inheritance” or ordinary property under civil law, nor are they sufficiently qualified to be recognized as legal subjects. Therefore, frozen embryos should be approached as a sui generis legal entity with a dependent legal status, simultaneously governed by personal rights and legal liability mechanisms under certain circumstances. Based on this approach, resolving situations arising upon the termination of marriage due to divorce or the death of one spouse should be considered in relation to the balance between personal rights and the lawful interests of the parties concerned. In the case of divorce, the right to decide the fate of frozen embryos should not be regarded as a subject of property division, but should be based on the agreement of the parties; in the absence of agreement, the handling of embryos must prioritize the protection of each party’s reproductive rights while avoiding forcing an individual to become a parent against their will.
In cases where one spouse or both spouses die, frozen embryos should not be automatically regarded as the inheritance of the deceased. Instead, the right to dispose of embryos should be considered on the basis of the deceased’s prior expressed intention, if any, or on the basis of the consent of the surviving party within the framework of protecting personal rights and the legitimate interests of the relevant parties. This approach allows for maintaining respect for reproductive rights while limiting the risk of embryos falling into a legal status of “ownerless property” or being treated in a rigid manner due to the lack of a clear legal basis.
II.
Legal Framework in Selected Countries on the Resolution of Disputes over Frozen Embryos
2.1.
The Contractual Approach Model
In the United States legal system, the development of embryo cryopreservation technology not only opens up opportunities for family formation for many individuals but also creates complex legal gaps when couples terminate their marriage. Due to the absence of uniform federal regulation, states have developed distinct doctrines to resolve disputes over embryo ownership. Among these, the contractual approach is the most common, based on the principle of respecting the freedom of disposition of individuals and the stability of civil relations.
For example, in Illinois, courts often regard embryos as marital assets for the purpose of division upon the dissolution of marriage. Illinois is an “equitable distribution state,” meaning that courts divide marital property in a fair and reasonable manner between the parties. However, embryos constitute a special form of marital property that is not clearly subject to equitable distribution, particularly because they lack monetary value. Moreover, in cases of marital dissolution or separation of unmarried couples, dispositional agreements and informed consent contracts play a central role for courts in determining how embryos should be allocated. Under the contractual approach, courts strictly examine any existing dispositional agreements signed by the parties to determine the allocation of embryos in the event of a dispute. The principles of contract law govern this adjudication process.
The contractual approach is clearly illustrated in the decision of the New York appellate court in Finkelstein v. Finkelstein (2013). In this case, a married couple had cryopreserved embryos prior to their divorce. The parties disputed the allocation of these embryos because the husband no longer wished for the wife to use them. Previously, both parties had signed an informed consent document with the fertility clinic, stating that they “agreed to the cryopreservation of embryos for their own use.” Furthermore, the document also provided that either party or both parties could “withdraw consent and terminate participation at any time.”
The court determined that the husband had lawfully withdrawn his consent. Despite the wife’s request to use the embryos—representing her only biological opportunity to have a child—the court still enforced the contract and ruled that neither party was permitted to use the embryos. Ultimately, the court ordered the fertility clinic to destroy the embryos in accordance with the signed consent agreement.
This approach shares similarities but also exhibits distinct features when compared to the legal system of Indonesia. In Indonesia, agreements on the storage of frozen embryos are established as innominate contracts (innominaat agreement), grounded in the principle of freedom of contract under Article 1338 of the Civil Code (Civil Code of 1847). For such an agreement to be legally valid, it must satisfy the four conditions set out in Article 1320, including: (1) mutual consent, (2) legal capacity, (3) a definite object, and (4) a lawful cause.
Indonesia currently maintains a strict legal framework through specialized regulatory instruments, particularly Circular No. 2 of the Minister of Health in 2025. Accordingly, Indonesia establishes an absolute restriction: embryo implantation is strictly prohibited if the father has died or the couple has divorced. This provision indirectly indicates that such changes in personal status may serve as a legal basis for terminating the storage agreement. In terms of legal consequences, the termination of embryo cryopreservation agreements may vary depending on the cause and specific contractual terms. The contractual approach emphasizes predictability, strictly upholding the principle of freedom of contract, whereby the parties’ initial intent at the time of initiating IVF serves as the governing “law” for dispute resolution, regardless of subsequent changes in circumstances.
2.2.
The Model Prioritizing Contemporaneous Mutual Consent
In contrast to the fragmented precedents in the United States and the lack of specific regulations in Indonesia, the United Kingdom has established a unified and stringent legal framework through the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (HFE Act). This Act not only designates embryos as special entities requiring ethical respect but also establishes the “Contemporaneous Mutual Consent” model as an immutable principle governing the disposition of genetic material.
This mechanism is specified in Schedule 3 of the HFE Act 1990, which regulates the consent of gamete providers. According to Paragraphs 1 and 8, an embryo created through in vitro fertilisation may only be used or transferred when there is “effective consent” from all relevant parties (the gamete providers). This approach demonstrates that consent is not understood as a one-time legal act at the commencement of treatment but rather as a legal status that must be continuously maintained until the embryo is actually used.
Furthermore, the HFE Act recognises the right to withdraw consent as provided in Paragraph 5. Accordingly, each party has the right to unilaterally change or withdraw their intention in writing submitted to the storage facility, provided that the embryo has not yet been used, i.e., not transferred into a woman’s body or used in research. In the event that one party withdraws consent for storage, Paragraph 6 establishes a humane mechanism through a “cooling-off period” of 12 months, during which the medical facility must continue to preserve the embryos and notify the other party.
This principle is strongly affirmed in the case ARB v. IVF Hammersmith Ltd (2018). The case involved a married couple who became estranged while undergoing divorce proceedings. The dispute arose when the wife (Mrs. R) forged the husband’s (Mr. ARB’s) signature on consent documents in order to continue using the remaining frozen embryos from a previous treatment cycle. Despite the absence of genuine consent from the husband, the medical facility proceeded with embryo transfer, resulting in the birth of a baby girl in 2011.
Mr. ARB subsequently brought a claim against the medical facility for breach of contract, arguing that the use of the embryos without his actual and informed consent was unlawful. Although the medical facility argued that it acted in good faith based on apparently valid signed documents, the lack of genuine consent rendered the procedure unlawful. The Court of Appeal of England and Wales held that the medical facility had breached its strict contractual obligation. Accordingly, the clinic bore an absolute responsibility to ensure the existence of “continuous consent” from both parties at the time of embryo thawing and transfer; good faith or subjective belief on the part of the medical facility could not substitute for the legally protected actual will of the individual.
Notably, even after the child was born, the court remained firm in the principle that an individual’s autonomy over their own genetic material is absolute and cannot be overridden by the will of a spouse, even during the subsistence of a legally valid marital relationship. However, the court rejected Mr. ARB’s claim for compensation for child-rearing costs. Although the court found the clinic to be in breach of contract, the claim was dismissed on public policy grounds established in a series of wrongful birth cases, including McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board (2000) and Rees v. Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust (2004). In other words, despite being unplanned, Mr. ARB remained the legal father of the child and was required to assume parental responsibilities under English law.
The rigidity of English law in this model reflects a profound humanistic philosophy: becoming a parent must be a fully voluntary decision at the actual time of conception, and cannot be imposed by prior agreements or unilateral decisions of a partner. This case illustrates that English law is willing to maintain a strict regulatory system to protect an individual’s autonomy over their genetic material, treating it as a non-negotiable boundary ensuring that no one is compelled to bear the consequences of parenthood without genuine consent.
Consistent with the philosophy of the United Kingdom, the legal system of China also establishes the “Contemporaneous Mutual Consent” model as a core principle for resolving disputes over embryos. In typical cases where one party requests the use of embryos for reproduction while the other refuses after the termination of the relationship, Chinese law prioritizes the parties’ current will over prior agreements.
Chinese judicial practice confirms this approach in the case Chen v. Xu (2015). The parties married in 1992, underwent infertility treatment, and had embryos cryopreserved at a hospital in April 2014. They divorced through litigation in December 2014, after which Xu remarried. Because Xu refused to give consent, Chen was unable to proceed with embryo transfer. Chen brought a claim against Xu for infringing her reproductive rights. In this case, the court established an important precedent: the right to reproduce and the right not to reproduce are equally protected by law, and both parties who created the embryos retain absolute autonomy over their personal reproductive interests. The court affirmed that the consent of both parties is a mandatory requirement at the time of embryo transfer; therefore, the reproductive rights of the former wife cannot be exercised by infringing upon the right not to reproduce of the former husband. This ruling demonstrates a strong convergence between Chinese law and the UK HFE Act in treating consent not as a static commitment made at the outset, but as a legal status that must be continuously maintained, ensuring that no individual is forced into parenthood against their will after the breakdown of the marital relationship, thereby affirming the supremacy of personal autonomy in the field of biomedical law.
This approach adopted by the United Kingdom and China presents a clear contrast to the contractual priority model in certain U.S. states. It affirms that in such sensitive domains as assisted reproduction, civil agreements must yield to personal autonomy and the freedom from coercion within family relationships. This provides valuable lessons for Vietnam in balancing the supremacy of agreements with the protection of human rights in post-marital embryo disputes.
2.3.
The Balancing of Interests Model (Balancing of Interests Approach)
In the legal system of Israel, the resolution of embryo disputes is not based purely on contract law (as in the United States and Indonesia) or on an absolute principle of continuous consent (as in the United Kingdom), but rather addresses disputes concerning cryopreserved embryos upon the termination of marriage through a more flexible and humane legal reasoning under the Balancing of Interests model. Due to the absence of a specialized statute governing embryo disputes, Israeli adjudicative bodies have applied case law precedents and guidelines issued by the Ministry of Health to resolve conflicts.
Under this model, when the parties fail to reach an agreement or when one party withdraws their initial consent, the court does not automatically order the destruction of the embryo or mechanically enforce the contract. Instead, adjudicative bodies place opposing constitutional rights on the legal “scale”: on one side is the right to parenthood, and on the other is the right not to be compelled to become a parent.
A landmark case exemplifying this model is Nahmani v. Nahmani (1996)[30] before the Supreme Court of Israel. After the dissolution of their marriage, the wife (Ruth) wished to proceed with gestational surrogacy using the cryopreserved embryos—the last opportunity for her to have a child after losing her ability to conceive. In contrast, the husband (Daniel) withdrew his consent as he did not wish to be compelled to become a father. Across multiple levels of adjudication, the Supreme Court of Israel, sitting in a panel of 11 justices, engaged in a balancing of “the lesser of two evils”: on one side, the burden of being an unwilling father, and on the other, the permanent deprivation of the ability to become a mother. By a 7–4 majority, the Court ruled in favor of the wife, affirming that, within the Israeli cultural and legal context, the aspiration to create life and the right to realize parenthood must carry greater weight than the husband’s right to refuse.
The Court’s reasoning was grounded not only in compassion but also in well-established legal doctrines. First, the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel holds that when the wife relied on the husband’s initial consent to undergo fertilization and thereby irreversibly changed her personal circumstances, the husband is estopped from withdrawing his consent. Second, the Court considered moral justice and Jewish tradition, which places strong emphasis on the continuation of lineage.
Similarly to Israel, although China strictly applies the continuous consent model, its judicial system is also opening important foundations for the application of the Balancing of Interests approach to resolve complex conflicts of personal interests. A core distinction in Chinese legal reasoning is reflected in its approach to parental status in disputes. A typical illustration of this trend is the judgment in Wang v. Zhang (2013)[31]. In this case, Wang and Zhang were partners who underwent IVF procedures, resulting in the birth of two children in 2001 and 2002. They also stored over ten surplus embryos in a hospital. After their relationship ended in 2008, Wang unilaterally used the cryopreserved embryos to give birth to a child, allegedly through surrogacy (as she was unable to conceive for medical reasons). She then filed a lawsuit requesting the court to confirm Zhang’s paternity and to compel him to assume parental responsibilities for the child.
This position indicates that in China, the balancing of interests approach is being proposed as a supplementary test to the existing consent principle. Accordingly, in exceptional cases where one embryo-creating party has permanently lost reproductive capacity—a circumstance carrying significant weight within the Chinese cultural context that emphasizes the continuation of lineage—the court may consider permitting the use of embryos as a last resort. However, to ensure fairness, the opposing party will be granted the option not to be recognized as the legal parent of the child born.
This flexible application enables Chinese law to avoid the rigidity of a purely biological connection model. This is clearly demonstrated through its contrast with the case of ARB v. IVF Hammersmith Ltd, where the father, despite having his signature forged, was still compelled to acknowledge parental status and bear all financial obligations based on genetic linkage. In contrast, the Chinese approach (as exemplified in the case of Wang v. Zhang) has taken a groundbreaking step by designating the party whose will was violated as a “presumed sperm donor,” thereby completely severing legal ties and maintenance obligations toward the child born against their will. The Chinese approach affirms that balancing the right to parenthood of the infertile party and the right not to be compelled into parenthood of the other party must be grounded in respect for human dignity and personal autonomy. By prioritizing reproductive autonomy, the Chinese judiciary not only protects individuals from unauthorized misuse of embryos but also minimizes legal and social harm, ensuring that no one is forced into a parental relationship without voluntary and explicit consent. This constitutes a valuable lesson for Vietnamese law: in sensitive disputes, replacing rigid property-based rules with a well-calibrated balancing-of-interests mechanism can help safeguard the legitimate interests of the weaker party and ensure decisions that are both legally sound and equitable.
Within the legal system of Israel, the resolution of embryo disputes is not based purely on contract law (as in the United States and Indonesia) or on absolute contemporaneous mutual consent (as in the United Kingdom). Instead, disputes over cryopreserved embryos upon the dissolution of marriage are addressed through a more flexible and humane legal reasoning under the balancing of interests model. In the absence of a specific statute governing embryo disputes, Israeli adjudicatory bodies have relied on judicial precedents and guidelines issued by the Ministry of Health to resolve such conflicts.
Under this model, when the parties fail to reach an agreement or when one party withdraws their initial consent, the court does not automatically order the destruction of the embryos or mechanically enforce the contract. Instead, adjudicatory bodies place on the legal “scale” the competing constitutional rights: on one side, the right to parenthood, and on the other, the right not to be a parent.
A landmark case exemplifying this model is Nahmani v. Nahmani (1996)[30] before the Supreme Court of Israel. Following the dissolution of their marriage, the wife (Ruth) sought to proceed with surrogacy using the cryopreserved embryos—her last opportunity to have a child after having lost the ability to carry a pregnancy. In contrast, the husband (Daniel) withdrew his consent, as he did not wish to be compelled into fatherhood. Through multiple levels of adjudication, the Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as an eleven-judge panel, conducted a balancing between “two evils” (the lesser of two evils): on one side, the inconvenience of unwanted fatherhood, and on the other, the permanent suffering resulting from being deprived of the ability to become a mother. By a 7–4 majority, the Court ruled in favor of the wife, affirming that within the cultural and legal context of Israel, the aspiration to create life and the right to realize parenthood must be accorded greater weight than the husband’s right to refuse.
The Court’s reasoning did not rest merely on empathy but was grounded in rigorous legal doctrines. First, the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel was applied, under which, once the wife had relied upon the husband’s initial consent to undergo fertilization and had irreversibly altered her personal circumstances, the husband was precluded from withdrawing his intent. Second, the Court took into account moral justice and Jewish traditions, which place a strong emphasis on the continuation of lineage.
Similarly to Israel, although China formally adheres to a strict contemporaneous mutual consent model, its judicial system is also laying important groundwork for the application of the balancing of interests approach to resolve complex conflicts involving personal rights. A fundamental distinction in Chinese legal reasoning is reflected in its approach to parenthood status in the context of disputes. A representative illustration of this trend is the judgment in Wang v. Zhang (2013)[31]. In this case, Wang and Zhang were partners who had undergone IVF procedures, resulting in the birth of two children in 2001 and 2002. They also stored more than ten surplus embryos at a hospital. After their relationship ended in 2008, Wang unilaterally used the frozen embryos to give birth to another child, reportedly through surrogacy (as she was medically unable to carry a pregnancy). She subsequently filed a petition before the court seeking recognition of Zhang’s paternity and requesting that he assume parental responsibilities in raising the child. Faced with the claim for recognition of parental status and maintenance obligations brought by the wife against her former husband, the Chinese court applied an intent-based test inferred from Article 40 of the Circular guiding the implementation of the Civil Code on Marriage and Family. The Court held that, since the husband had not consented to the use of the embryos and the child had been conceived against his will, he bore no paternal responsibility despite the genetic connection. In doing so, the Court established a progressive legal concept by characterizing the husband as a “constructive sperm donor,” thereby protecting his reproductive autonomy against involuntary parenthood.
This position indicates that in China, the balancing of interests approach is being proposed as a supplementary test to the existing consent principle. Accordingly, in exceptional cases where one embryo-creating party has permanently lost reproductive capacity—a circumstance carrying significant weight within the Chinese cultural context that emphasizes the continuation of lineage—the court may consider permitting the use of embryos as a last resort. However, to ensure fairness, the opposing party will be granted the option not to be recognized as the legal parent of the child born.
This flexible application enables Chinese law to avoid the rigidity of a purely biological connection model. This is clearly illustrated by its contrast with the case of ARB v. IVF Hammersmith Ltd, where the father, despite having his signature forged, was still compelled to acknowledge parental status and bear all financial responsibilities based on genetic linkage. In contrast, the Chinese approach (as exemplified in Wang v. Zhang) has taken a groundbreaking step by designating the party whose will was violated as a “constructive sperm donor,” thereby completely severing legal ties and maintenance obligations toward the child born against their will. The Chinese approach affirms that balancing the right to parenthood of the infertile party and the right not to be compelled into parenthood of the other party must be grounded in respect for human dignity and personal autonomy. By prioritizing reproductive autonomy, the Chinese judiciary not only protects individuals from unauthorized misuse of embryos but also minimizes legal and social harm, ensuring that no one is forced into a parental relationship without voluntary and explicit consent. This constitutes a valuable lesson for Vietnamese law: in sensitive disputes, replacing rigid property-based rules with a well-calibrated balancing-of-interests mechanism can help safeguard the legitimate interests of the weaker party and ensure decisions that are both equitable and reasonable.
III.
The Current State of Vietnamese Law on the Resolution of Disputes over Cryopreserved Embryos upon the Dissolution of Marriage
3.1.
Positive Law of Vietnam on the Resolution of Disputes over Cryopreserved Embryos upon the Dissolution of Marriage
Within the current Vietnamese legal system, the establishment of rights and obligations concerning cryopreserved embryos upon the termination of a marital relationship remains a legal “grey area” that has not been fully explored. The core issue lies in the fact that Vietnamese law has not yet approached the civil nature and the complex conflicts of personal rights arising from these potential living entities.
Specifically, the most direct legal instrument governing this field is Government Decree No. 10/2015/GD (as amended and supplemented by Government Decree No. 98/2016/GD). Under Article 21 and Article 22, the Decree establishes a regime for embryo storage based on the principle of agreement through an “embryo storage contract.” This is also one of the few legal normative documents that directly addresses the case of marital termination under Clauses 2 and 3 of Article 21. Accordingly, the legislator sets out the principle that embryos shall be destroyed after the death of one spouse, unless the surviving party wishes to continue storage; similarly, upon the dissolution of marriage, embryos shall be destroyed with the written consent of both spouses; if they wish to continue storage, an application must be submitted and storage fees must continue to be paid. However, this regulation only addresses part of the issues relating to cryopreserved embryos and does not comprehensively anticipate the full range of legal questions arising after the dissolution of marriage. These include, for example: cases where one spouse dies and the spouses had previously entered into a written agreement allowing the surviving party to continue using the embryos for pregnancy and childbirth or for surrogacy; or where the deceased had expressed the इच्छा to have a child posthumously through similar means; or where both spouses have died and their relatives request surrogacy so that a child may be born and legally recognized as the child of the deceased couple for purposes of inheritance and the settlement of issues related to traditions and customs; similarly, for divorced couples, comparable issues may arise where there was a prior agreement, or where after the dissolution of marriage one party unilaterally uses the embryos to have a child or engages another person to carry a pregnancy, or donates the embryos to another person; or where the parties seek to divide the embryos for subsequent use. In such situations, the mechanism for dispute resolution remains a difficult challenge for Vietnamese law.
From the perspective of the Law on Marriage and Family 2014, a legal paradox arises when attempting to classify embryos for the purpose of dispute resolution. Embryos cannot be considered “fetuses,” as an embryo is defined as the product of the combination of an ovum and a sperm (Clause 5, Article 2 of Government Decree No. 10/2015/GD as amended and supplemented by Government Decree No. 98/2016/GD). From a biological standpoint, a clear distinction must be made between stages of human development to determine the appropriate subject of legal regulation. According to biological progression, an embryo represents only a precursor stage, formed from the fusion of male and female gametes and undergoing continuous cell division before reaching the developmental threshold of a true fetus. Thus, an embryo cannot be equated with a fetus, as it remains only a potential living entity, lacking complete structural differentiation of the body and internal organs. Vietnamese law currently does not contain any provision recognizing embryos as human beings. Conversely, if embryos are treated as a form of “common property” to be divided under Articles 59 to 64 of this Law, serious ethical and legal barriers arise. Property division typically concerns use value or exchange value, whereas embryos embody genetic material and the potential to become a human being—an entity that cannot be valued. The absence of specific legal norms places judges in a state of uncertainty when confronted with petitions seeking the division of such an “object” as embryos and disputes related thereto, such as the determination of parentage.
3.2. Kiến nghị hoàn thiện pháp luật Việt Nam
Xuất phát từ thực trạng pháp luật Việt Nam hiện nay còn
thiếu hụt các quy phạm điều chỉnh trực tiếp đối với việc giải quyết tranh chấp
phôi thai trữ đông, đồng thời chưa hình thành án lệ hay thực tiễn xét xử mang
tính định hướng, việc hoàn thiện pháp luật trong lĩnh vực này cần được tiếp cận
một cách toàn diện, nhất quán và đặc biệt thận trọng. Kinh nghiệm lập pháp và
tư pháp so sánh từ hai hệ thống pháp luật lớn là Common Law và Civil Law cho
thấy không tồn tại một mô hình duy nhất mang tính tuyệt đối; mỗi quốc gia đều
xây dựng hướng đi riêng dựa trên triết lý pháp lý về mối quan hệ giữa tự do cam
kết dân sự, quyền tự quyết sinh sản và giá trị nhân thân gắn với sự sống tiềm
năng. Tranh chấp phôi thai, vì thế, không đơn thuần là tranh chấp tài sản hay
hợp đồng, mà là sự va chạm trực tiếp giữa các quyền nhân thân cốt lõi gắn với
sinh sản, thân thể và phẩm giá con người.
Do đó, mục tiêu của quá trình hoàn thiện pháp luật không chỉ
nhằm khắc phục khoảng trống pháp lý, mà còn hướng tới việc kiến tạo một cơ chế
điều chỉnh hài hòa giữa quyền tự quyết sinh sản, quyền không bị cưỡng ép làm cha
mẹ, quyền lợi của trẻ em trong tương lai và các giá trị nền tảng của đạo đức
sinh học. Thay vì sao chép máy móc bất kỳ mô hình đơn lẻ nào, Việt Nam nên lựa
chọn hướng tiếp cận dung hòa thông qua việc xây dựng mô hình hỗn hợp có thứ bậc
ưu tiên. Trong đó: (1) Ưu tiên thỏa thuận được xác lập là nguyên tắc nền tảng
để bảo đảm tính dự báo; (2) Sự đồng thuận liên tục được ghi nhận như một giới
hạn nhân thân không thể bị vượt qua để bảo vệ ý chí hiện tại của chủ thể; và
(3) Cơ chế cân bằng lợi ích được sử dụng như một công cụ ngoại lệ nhằm bảo vệ
bên yếu thế về sinh học trong các tình huống đặc biệt nhạy cảm.
Từ tinh thần đó, các kiến nghị hoàn thiện pháp luật được đề
xuất theo ba nhóm trọng tâm sau đây:
3.2.1.
Supplementing Provisions on the Establishment of the Legal Status of Cryopreserved Embryos
Vietnamese law needs to definitively establish the legal status of cryopreserved embryos. The current lack of clear classification not only causes difficulties in legal practice but also creates the risk of mechanically applying legal institutions that are inherently incompatible with the nature of embryos, particularly the regime of common property of spouses upon the dissolution of marriage.
Accordingly, cryopreserved embryos should be defined as a “sui generis legal entity.” Embryos cannot be regarded as property in the ordinary sense, as they do not possess exchange value, cannot be monetarily valued, and cannot be subject to division like other tangible assets. At the same time, embryos cannot yet be considered human beings for the purpose of fully applying provisions on children’s rights or personal rights, as they have not reached the threshold of independent biological and legal existence. The establishment of a sui generis legal status allows the law to recognize embryos as potential living entities closely associated with the reproductive personal rights of those who created them, thereby providing a theoretical and legal foundation for the development of specific regulatory norms, avoiding overlap or forced application of existing legal rules.
On that basis, Vietnamese law should affirm the principle of “non-commercialization of cryopreserved embryos as a fundamental and inviolable principle.” The law must strictly prohibit all acts of buying, selling, exchanging, pledging, mortgaging, or using embryos as an equivalent object in the process of resolving the dissolution of marriage or division of property. The disposition of embryos must only be carried out on a voluntary basis, for humanitarian, medical, or scientific purposes in accordance with strict legal regulations, and must never become a means for economic gain or a bargaining tool in family disputes.
The principle of non-commercialization is not only consistent with international bioethical standards but also deeply compatible with the cultural traditions, social morals, and humanistic values of Vietnamese law regarding the value of human life. The clear recognition of the sui generis legal status of cryopreserved embryos and the principle of non-commercialization will provide a solid foundation for the Vietnamese legal system to approach disputes over cryopreserved embryos in a cautious, humane, and developmentally appropriate manner in line with modern medical advancements.
3.2.2.
Establishing a System of Principles for Dispute Resolution
In addition to improving regulations on the disposition of cryopreserved embryos, Vietnamese law needs to establish a system of guiding principles for dispute resolution in order to assist adjudicatory bodies in handling practical situations in a consistent manner, with a clear theoretical foundation, and to minimize discretionary decision-making in adjudication. In the context where cryopreserved embryos constitute a new legal subject with a hybrid nature combining biological elements and personal rights, the development of foundational principles is a necessary condition to ensure legal predictability and the stability of family relationships formed through assisted reproductive technologies.
First, Vietnamese law should establish the principle of priority of agreement as the foundation for resolving disputes over cryopreserved embryos. Under this principle, courts and medical establishments are obliged to respect and enforce the content of embryo disposition contracts or other lawful agreements concluded by the parties prior to the emergence of the dispute. The voluntary intent of the parties at the time of embryo creation should be protected as a special form of freedom of commitment, as it reflects a process of careful consideration in medical, psychological, and legal aspects before intervening in the natural reproductive process. Prioritizing agreements not only aligns with the principle of freedom of contract in civil law but also helps reduce the burden on the judicial system and limits the risk of prolonged conflicts, as the parties are able to anticipate the legal consequences of their reproductive decisions.
However, due to the special nature of cryopreserved embryos, the law cannot absolutize the principle of priority of agreement. In cases where no agreement exists, the agreement is invalid, or its content does not clearly reflect the common intent of the parties, the law should allow courts to apply the principle of equity based on the balancing of interests model. Accordingly, as a general rule, the right not to be compelled to become a parent should be given priority protection, in order to avoid imposing personal obligations contrary to individual will and the resulting long-term legal, psychological, and social consequences. From a human rights perspective, the right not to have children is of equal value to the right to have children and should be afforded equivalent legal protection.
Nevertheless, this principle is not absolute. In exceptional circumstances, where the party requesting the use of embryos can demonstrate that this constitutes their sole and irreplaceable biological opportunity to have a child, and that refusal to allow such use would permanently deprive them of the ability to become a biological parent, the law should recognize a reasonable exception. In such cases, the balance of interests may tilt in favor of protecting the right to parenthood of the biologically more vulnerable party, provided that the use of embryos does not seriously infringe upon the fundamental lawful rights and interests of the other party, particularly the right not to bear parental obligations against their will if the law permits the application of corresponding exemption mechanisms.
The clear establishment of a hierarchy between general principles and such exceptions will enable courts to avoid evading their adjudicatory responsibilities or issuing merely formal compromise decisions, while also creating the necessary legal predictability for parties participating in assisted reproduction processes. On that basis, the Law on Marriage and Family should also establish a specific principle for determining parentage in cases where cryopreserved embryos are used to conceive a child after the termination of the marital relationship. The determination of parental status should be based on factors such as prior agreements of the parties, legally effective court decisions, and the principle of ensuring the best interests of the child, including the right to have legally recognized parents and the right to know their biological origins in accordance with the spirit of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child.
3.2.3.
Supplementing Mechanisms for the Establishment of the Right to Dispose of Cryopreserved Embryos
In the context where assisted reproductive technologies are increasingly developing and widely applied in Vietnam, the management and resolution of disputes related to cryopreserved embryos pose new legal challenges that the current legal framework has not yet fully addressed. In practice, Vietnamese law still lacks specific provisions directly governing the complex personal–civil relationships arising from the creation, storage, and use of cryopreserved embryos. This gap becomes particularly evident in situations where marital relationships are terminated, where conflicts of reproductive intent arise between the parties, or where one of the embryo-creating subjects no longer exists fully in a legal sense.
Comparative legislative experience demonstrates a shift from a purely administrative management model to a regulatory mechanism based on responsible agreement as an inevitable and effective trajectory. Vietnamese law should develop a specialized and comprehensive legal normative document on assisted reproduction similar to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (HFE Act) of the United Kingdom, in order to clearly define the legal status of embryos and to establish systematic rules for resolving conflicts of intent. Within such a statute, the priority of agreement model (as reflected in the experiences of the United States and Indonesia) should serve as the foundational principle to ensure predictability and respect for the initial intent of couples. Concurrently, the statute should incorporate the contemporaneous mutual consent model to establish a safe “personal boundary,” allowing individuals to withdraw their consent prior to embryo implantation in order to protect the right not to be compelled into parenthood. Importantly, to address ethically deadlocked scenarios, the statute must also provide space for the balancing of interests model (as applied in Israel and China), functioning as a final “safety valve” for judicial intervention in cases where embryos represent the sole biological opportunity for the more vulnerable party. The integrated application of these three models within a unified legal framework would enable Vietnam to safeguard freedom of contract while ensuring humanity and fairness in particularly sensitive personal matters.
The necessity of promulgating a specialized statute stems from the fact that cryopreserved embryos are not merely objects of medical management, but also entities closely associated with the reproductive personal rights of their creators. Vietnamese law should restructure the regulatory approach toward cryopreserved embryos in a preventive direction, in which the recognition and protection of the parties’ intent at the time of embryo creation plays a central role.
First, it is necessary to introduce mandatory provisions on embryo disposition agreements. On that basis, the new statute should clearly stipulate a mandatory rule as follows: “Prior to embryo storage, the couple and the medical establishment must enter into an embryo disposition agreement (accompanied by an embryo storage contract). This agreement shall constitute the sole legal basis for determining the fate of the embryos in the event of divorce or the death of one or both parties.” This provision allows the law to shift from a mechanism of ex post dispute resolution to one of ex ante conflict prevention, in which the intent of the parties at the time of embryo creation is recorded, preserved, and respected as a central legal standard. Unlike ordinary civil contracts, embryo disposition agreements must be made in writing, on the basis of full and mandatory counseling in both medical and legal aspects, in order to ensure that the parties’ consent is voluntary, informed, and made under conditions of balanced information.
The content of embryo disposition agreements must specifically anticipate potential legal scenarios, including but not limited to the dissolution of marriage, the death of one party, loss of civil act capacity, or the cessation of intent to use the embryos. Requiring such prior anticipation not only facilitates adjudicatory bodies when disputes arise but also serves to shape the behavior and mindset of the parties from the outset, compelling them to seriously consider the long-term legal consequences of participating in assisted reproduction. Accordingly, the embryo disposition agreement is not merely a formal procedure but becomes a core legal instrument ensuring the stability and predictability of legal relationships arising from IVF.
Second, it is necessary to clearly define the rights and obligations of each subject in relation to cryopreserved embryos. Current Vietnamese law does not clearly delineate the scope of each party’s rights over their genetic material, particularly in the context of marital dissolution, resulting in legal uncertainty when disputes arise and fostering defensive attitudes from the party opposing the use of embryos. Therefore, the law must establish a mandatory normative framework to clearly define the rights and obligations of the parties involved in embryo creation.
Accordingly, the law should provide that: “each spouse or each gamete provider shall have equal rights in determining the fate of cryopreserved embryos, including the right to decide on the use of embryos for reproduction, the right to consent or refuse continued storage, the right to donate embryos for scientific research or medical treatment in accordance with the law, as well as the right to request termination of storage and destruction of embryos in compliance with professional procedures.” These rights must be exercised on the basis of the parties’ mutual consent, ensuring that no individual is compelled to participate in reproduction against their will. However, to avoid excessive rigidity leading to unjust outcomes, the law should provide exceptions in special cases where one party can demonstrate that the use of embryos represents their sole and irreplaceable biological opportunity to have a child, and that permitting such use does not seriously infringe upon the core personal rights and legitimate interests of the other party. In such circumstances, the right to dispose of embryos may be established through a legally effective court decision based on a balancing of interests and the protection of the biologically more vulnerable party.
Alongside the right of disposition, the law must clearly establish corresponding legal obligations. First, the law should provide for financial obligations arising from embryo storage, including medical expenses, storage costs, and other reasonable expenses, to be implemented in accordance with the concluded embryo disposition agreement; in the absence of such an agreement or where the agreement is no longer valid, such obligations shall be allocated based on the principle of equitable sharing of responsibility, taking into account the degree of fault and the interests of each party. The clarification of financial obligations plays an important role in preventing irresponsible withdrawal or the exertion of economic pressure to compel the other party to relinquish their reproductive rights.
In particular, where embryos are used to conceive a child after the marital relationship has been terminated, the law must clearly provide a mechanism for establishing parental rights and obligations with respect to the child born. Accordingly, if the use of embryos is based on the prior lawful consent of both parties or on the basis of a legally effective court decision, the party who has consented or is bound by the judgment must bear full personal rights and obligations, maintenance obligations, and child-rearing responsibilities under the Law on Marriage and Family, and may not invoke the termination of marriage to refuse such responsibilities. Conversely, where one party does not consent to the use of embryos but the law nevertheless permits such use under an exception mechanism to protect the irreplaceable reproductive opportunity of the other party, it is necessary to establish a mechanism for exemption or limitation of parental obligations for the opposing party, in order to ensure the right not to be compelled into parenthood against their will. This mechanism not only protects reproductive autonomy but also helps to minimize psychological and social conflicts affecting children born under such special circumstances.
Third, it is necessary to recognize a conditional mechanism for withdrawal of consent. Vietnamese law should acknowledge the right of each party to unilaterally withdraw consent to the use of embryos prior to the implantation of the embryo into the uterus, in order to protect autonomy over one’s body and genetic material. However, the right to withdraw consent should not be designed as an absolute right, as without appropriate control mechanisms, it may be abused as a tool for exerting pressure, causing delay, or retaliating in the context of a dissolved marital relationship. Therefore, the law should place the right to withdraw consent within a framework of civil liability proportionate to the consequences caused to the other party.
Specifically, the law should provide that: “a party has the right to withdraw consent before embryo implantation, but must compensate for all medical expenses, storage costs, and other reasonable expenses that the other party has paid or committed to pay based on legitimate reliance on the initial consent.” This approach both ensures the flexibility and humanity of the principle of consent in bioethics and maintains fairness in civil relations by requiring that a party exercising personal rights bear responsibility proportionate to the legal and economic consequences of their actions. Thereby, the law not only protects reproductive autonomy but also prevents the abuse of personal rights to the detriment of others in post-dissolution disputes.
CONCLUSION
The resolution of disputes over cryopreserved embryos upon the dissolution of marriage is not merely the division of a form of common property, but a process of delineating fundamental personal rights intrinsically linked to the potential of human life. This study demonstrates that the current purely administrative regulatory approach in Vietnam has revealed its limitations when confronted with the complexity of modern civil relationships. In order to safeguard reproductive autonomy—an inseparable component of human dignity—Vietnamese law must undergo a fundamental shift: from viewing embryos as “medical products” to establishing a sui generis legal status for them.
The selective adaptation of international experiences constitutes the key to resolving existing impasses: namely, the transparency of the priority of agreement model (United States), the humanistic protection of present autonomy embodied in the contemporaneous mutual consent model (United Kingdom), and the flexibility of the balancing of interests model (Israel). The path toward legal reform should not be limited to mandating pre-dispute embryo disposition agreements, but must also establish a human-centered adjudicatory mechanism to protect the weaker party when their final biological opportunity is at stake.
A transparent legal framework, harmoniously combining the principle of freedom of contract with bioethical values, will not only liberate embryos from being “trapped” in prolonged disputes but also affirm the State’s protective role with respect to core personal rights. This is not merely a legislative requirement, but a humanistic solution to ensure that every potential life is determined with respect, justice, and the absolute voluntariness of the individuals concerned.
Assoc. Prof. Dr., Senior Lecturer, Hanoi Law University. Email: nguyenlanhngd@gmail.com, acceptance date: March 26, 2026.
** Class 4831, K48, Hanoi Law University.
*** Class 4831, K48, Hanoi Law University.
**** Class 4831, K48, Hanoi Law University.
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[8] 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
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[10] Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807, at *6 (Tenn. App. Sept. 13, 1990).
[11] Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th 84 (1993).
[12] Hecht v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. App. 4th 836 (1993).
[13] Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, sch. 3, para. 4.
[14] Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, s. 14.
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[20] Mary Beck, “Frozen Pre-embryo Practice in Missouri”, Journal of the Missouri Bar, 2019, No. 75, p. 126.
[21] Sarah Holman Loy, ibid., pp. 552–553.
[22] Finkelstein v. Finkelstein, 5820N 309125/13.
[23] Revi Inayatillah, Sonny Dewi Judiasih, Meliesa Permatahati (2025), “Embryo Frozen Storage Agreement According to Civil Law in Indonesia”, Jurnal Bina Mulia Hukum, 9(2), p. 297.
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[25] Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, sch. 3.
[26] ARB v. IVF Hammersmith Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2803.
[27] McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board (2000) 2 AC 59.
[28] Rees v. Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust (2004) 1 AC 309.
[29] Chen v. Xu (2015) Zhan Xia Fa Min Yi Chu Zi No. 335.
[30] FH 2401/95 Nachmani v. Nachmani, 50(4) PD 661 (1996).
[31] Wang v. Zhang (2013) Sui Zhong Fa Min Shen Zi No. 247.
