Abstract: Using a comparative approach, this article analyzes the mineral exploitation rights auction mechanism in the geological and mineral laws of Vietnam and Canada from the following perspectives: geological data transparency, valuation methods, exploration risk allocation, and the role of the community. From this, it points out some shortcomings in the regulations on mineral exploitation rights auctions in Vietnam's 2024 Geological and Mineral Law, and proposes some recommendations to contribute to improving the effectiveness of mineral resource governance.
Keywords: Auction of mineral exploitation rights, Law on Geology and Minerals 2024, Canadian experience, comparison.
1. Introduction
Auctioning of mineral exploitation rights is a key instrument in resource governance, aimed at ensuring transparency, enhancing allocation efficiency, and harmonizing the interests of the State, enterprises, and communities. The effectiveness of this mechanism depends not only on the auction procedures but is also associated with foundational elements of geological and mineral law, such as the transparency of geological data, valuation methods, allocation of exploration risks, and the role of community participation, etc. Under Vietnamese law, the auctioning of mineral exploitation rights has increasingly been affirmed as the primary method for granting exploitation rights; however, practical implementation still reveals limitations when considered in relation to the overall legal framework on geology and minerals, particularly in the context of implementing the Law on Geology and Minerals 2024.
Canada is selected as a reference framework in the comparative analysis, as it is a country with a stable mining industry, a mature mining market[1], and a resource governance framework recognized for its level of transparency, appropriate decentralization, as well as mechanisms for allocating exploitation rights based on competition.[2] At the same time, Canada’s mineral governance model reflects a relatively harmonious combination between the regulatory role of the central government and local authorities, between market-based mechanisms and requirements for environmental protection and community participation,[3] thereby providing a useful basis for comparison and for drawing policy implications and legal recommendations appropriate to the institutional and legal context of Viet Nam.
2. Auctioning of mineral exploitation rights - a perspective from the need for effective management of mineral resources
Minerals are non-renewable natural resources with significant economic value and are typically under public ownership managed by the State as its representative. Therefore, the allocation of mineral exploitation rights must ensure the efficient use of resources, prevent the loss of public assets, and ensure a reasonable distribution of benefits among the State, enterprises, and society. In this context, many countries adopt the mechanism of auctioning mineral exploitation rights as a market-based instrument to ensure that the allocation of exploitation rights is conducted in a transparent and competitive manner.
From the perspective of resource governance principles, the application of auction mechanisms for mineral exploitation rights arises from several objective requirements of mining activities.
First, auctioning mineral exploitation rights contributes to ensuring the principle of transparent and competitive allocation of public resources. Where mineral resources are under public ownership, granting exploitation rights through competitive mechanisms helps establish the economic value of such rights on a market basis, thereby overcoming the “ask–give” allocation mechanism, which entails risks of public asset loss and lack of transparency in governance.
Second, the auction mechanism is an effective instrument for selecting entities with adequate financial capacity, technology, and appropriate exploitation plans. In the mining sector, granting exploitation rights to entities lacking capacity or using outdated technologies may result in inefficient extraction, resource loss, and increased risks of negative environmental impacts. Through open competition in terms of price and project implementation capacity, the auctioning of mineral exploitation rights helps screen out entities that fail to meet the requirements while attracting capable enterprises, thereby enhancing management efficiency and the sustainable exploitation of mineral resources.
Third, auctioning mineral exploitation rights is an important solution for increasing state budget revenues. The winning bid price relatively reflects the market value of mineral resources at the time exploitation rights are granted, enabling the State to fully and accurately capture the added value derived from resource extraction. Accordingly, the benefits from mineral resources are distributed more harmoniously among the State, enterprises, and society.
From the perspective of effective mineral resource management, auctioning mineral exploitation rights is not merely a policy option but also an important mechanism to ensure that the allocation of exploitation rights is conducted in a transparent, efficient, and principled manner in line with public asset management. Based on these general principles, many legal systems have developed specific regulations to ensure that auction mechanisms operate in a fair and effective manner.
3. Comparison of elements of the mechanisms for auctioning mineral exploitation rights under the laws of Viet Nam and Canada
First, the governance model and decentralization in organizing auctions of mineral exploitation rights
In Viet Nam, minerals are defined as assets under all-people ownership, represented and uniformly managed by the State in accordance with the Constitution 2013[4] and the Law on Geology and Minerals 2024. On that basis, the authority to decide on the granting, extension, and revocation of mineral exploitation rights, as well as the organization of auctions for such rights, is primarily centralized at the central level; local authorities perform management within the scope of decentralization as prescribed by the law on geology and minerals.
This approach reflects a centralized resource management model, in which the State plays a central role in ensuring consistency in the control and allocation of high-value public assets with spillover effects on national interests. This model is grounded in resource governance analyses in the context of a unitary state, emphasizing the importance of concentrated authority to enhance coordination, supervision, and accountability,[5] and is also consistent with international recommendations regarding the leading role of the State in designing and operating institutional frameworks for mineral resource management.[6]
In contrast, Canada adopts a strong decentralization model. Section 92A of the Constitutional Act of 1867 (as amended in 1982) grants significant legislative authority to provinces over mineral resources within their territorial boundaries[7]. On that basis, each province enacts its own Mineral Law and independently determines appropriate mechanisms for granting rights, conducting auctions, or applying competitive selection processes in accordance with local conditions; the federal government manages resources only in certain special territories or offshore areas[8].
The comparison indicates that Viet Nam’s centralized management model is generally consistent with the characteristics of a unitary state and the need for unified control over strategically significant public assets. Meanwhile, Canada’s strong decentralization model is effective only in the context of a federal state with high local governance capacity and a mature mining market. Therefore, Viet Nam may find it difficult to adopt Canada’s territorially decentralized model, but it may draw lessons from the design of coordination mechanisms between central and local authorities in data preparation, supervision, and the implementation of auction processes.
Second, transparency of information and access to data for auction purposes
“In Viet Nam, the Law on Geology and Minerals 2024 establishes a unified system of geological and mineral information and data nationwide, including databases and digital infrastructure serving the storage, access, and utilization of information.[9] This system is formed from multiple sources such as basic geological surveys, geological surveys of minerals, exploration results, information on exploration and exploitation licenses, and data on areas subject to auction of mineral exploitation rights.[10] The law also stipulates the obligation of organizations and individuals engaged in mineral activities to submit and provide information in order to update the unified database, as well as mechanisms for data storage and provision to entities with demand.[11] The utilization of information is carried out through electronic information portals, written requests, or data exploitation contracts, but must comply with regulations on data storage and information confidentiality”[12]
However, this mechanism is designed in a centralized manner, whereby the State plays a dominant role in organizing the collection, standardization, and provision of geological data. This approach enhances control over resources and information related to mineral activities, but at the same time somewhat reduces the role of data as a factor promoting competition in the auction process.
Meanwhile, in Canada, access to information held by public authorities is ensured through the legal framework on transparency and the right of access to information. Under the Access to Information Act,[13] the purpose of the Act is to enhance accountability and transparency of federal institutions, based on the principle that government information should be publicly accessible and that exceptions to the right of access must be limited and specific (Section 2(1)–(2)). The Act also establishes the right of citizens and permanent residents to request access to records under the control of government institutions (Section 4(1)). On that legal basis, various types of data managed by public authorities, including geological and mineral data administered by specialized agencies of the provinces, are disclosed and made available to the public through online database systems. This mechanism contributes to reducing information asymmetry among investors and promotes transparent competition in the allocation of mineral exploitation rights.
The comparison indicates that Viet Nam’s centralized data management approach helps ensure control over public assets and limits the risk of information misuse, but at the same time reduces the role of data as an instrument for fostering competition in auctions.[14] Canada’s experience shows that enhancing transparency and opening geological data can support more efficient market functioning without weakening the State’s regulatory role. Accordingly, a potential reference for Viet Nam is to expand data accessibility on a gradual basis, rather than altering the centralized data management model.
Third, valuation methods and auction formats for mineral exploitation rights
Vietnamese law does not directly determine the value of mineral exploitation rights in auctions but instead applies an indirect valuation method through the mechanism of mineral exploitation right fees. Under the Law on Geology and Minerals 2024, such fees are determined based on three main factors: (i) the reserves and volume of minerals permitted for extraction; (ii) the price used for calculating the mineral exploitation right fee; and (iii) the rate of collection of the mineral exploitation right fee.[15] This amount is collected annually and finalized on the basis of actual extraction output, in order to ensure consistency between financial obligations and the level of resource exploitation[16], while the detailed formula and calculation methods are delegated to the Government for regulation[17]. In auction activities, the law does not put the entire exploitation right fee up for bidding but instead uses the rate of fee collection as the competitive parameter. The starting price is determined based on the rate of fee collection applicable to the same type of mineral in non-auction areas[18], and the auction result is the winning rate of fee collection applied to calculate the payable fee throughout the exploitation period. This approach indicates that the valuation mechanism in auctions of mineral exploitation rights in Viet Nam is designed as an indirect valuation through competition over financial obligations.
TMeanwhile, in Canada, the value of mineral resources is not determined through a fixed “exploitation right fee” as in Viet Nam, but is primarily recovered by the State through a system of royalties and other financial revenues prescribed by provinces[19]. Based on the authority stipulated in Section 92A of the Constitution Act, 1867, provincial legislatures are empowered to impose taxes and other charges on non-renewable resources, with each province establishing its own fiscal regime linked to the output and value of extracted resources[20]. In many provinces, royalties are calculated based on production volume or sales value and therefore fluctuate in accordance with market prices[21].
exploitation are designed in connection with the economic performance of individual mines through mineral tax regimes. Under the Mineral Tax Costs and Expenditures Regulation (BC Reg. 405/89) of the Province of British Columbia, Canada[22], deductible costs include exploration costs, pre-production development costs, capital expenditures for mining assets, mine operating costs, processing and distribution costs, as well as certain expenses related to environmental rehabilitation and scientific research supporting mining activities (s.2). Furthermore, this regulation classifies certain expenditures, such as exploration and discovery costs, as capital costs and provides for their separate treatment in determining tax liabilities arising from mining activities (s.3).
A similar approach is also reflected in Canadian provincial law. For instance, under the Mines and Minerals Act of the Province of Alberta (RSA 2000, c M-17)[23], minerals are owned by the State and exploitation may only be conducted under agreements issued by the Minister (s.2; s.16). These agreements enable the State to control resource extraction while imposing financial obligations on operators. Specifically, the law provides that royalties payable in respect of minerals extracted under such agreements shall accrue to the Government of Alberta (s.33), and the royalty rates are prescribed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council from time to time (s.34). In addition, the legal framework allows for the imposition of other payments, fees, or financial obligations related to mineral exploration and development through regulations issued by competent authorities (s.36). This mechanism reflects the principle that minerals are under State ownership and ensures that the economic value of resources is recovered through financial obligations throughout the extraction process.
A comparison with Canada indicates that Viet Nam’s mineral exploitation right fee mechanism is designed to provide relative stability and predictability regarding enterprises’ financial obligations over the entire exploitation period. However, since the rate of fee collection is determined at the time of auction and remains fixed throughout the license term, this mechanism may not fully reflect fluctuations in the economic value of resources in line with market conditions. In contrast, in Canada, financial obligations in the mining sector are typically designed with greater flexibility through a combination of royalties, resource taxes, and other charges linked to production or the value of extracted minerals. This approach allows the State to recover resource value more effectively in accordance with market fluctuations over the project lifecycle.
From a comparative perspective, Canada’s experience suggests that combining multiple fiscal instruments can enhance the flexibility of mechanisms for capturing resource value, thereby providing useful references for improving the financial regime governing mineral exploitation in Viet Nam.
Fourth, allocation of exploration risks in the mechanism for auctioning mineral exploitation rights
Compared with the Law on Minerals 2010, current Vietnamese law has undergone significant adjustments in the allocation of exploration risks within the mechanism for auctioning mineral exploitation rights. Previously, allowing auctions to be conducted in areas where no approved exploration results were available increased information asymmetry among investors, leading to difficulties in valuing exploitation rights and increasing risks for both the State and successful bidders.[24] The Law on Geology and Minerals 2024 emphasizes the role of the State in conducting basic geological surveys and establishing a unified system of geological and mineral information and data to provide an informational foundation for management and auction activities. Accordingly, the system of geological and mineral information and data is designed and managed uniformly nationwide, including data from basic geological surveys, geological surveys of minerals, exploration results, and information on areas subject to auction of mineral exploitation rights.[25] Organizations and individuals conducting geological surveys, exploration, and mineral exploitation are responsible for submitting and providing information to update this database[26], thereby enabling auction participants to access information on an equal legal footing and reducing information asymmetry.
However, the law does not transfer exploration risks and investment risks to the State. Organizations and individuals exploiting and using geological and mineral data must use such information for proper purposes, must not distort information, and bear responsibility for risks arising from the use of such information in investment and mineral exploitation decisions.[27] This approach is consistent with findings in resource governance studies in developing countries, which suggest that the State typically provides baseline information to reduce initial information asymmetry, while business and technical risks are allocated to investors after exploitation rights have been granted.[28] In contrast, Canada’s experience shows that the control of exploration risks is often addressed early at the stage of allocating exploitation rights through competitive investor selection mechanisms and strict legal conditions imposed on right holders[29]. Under the Public Lands Mineral Regulations (SOR/96-13) issued by the Government of Canada, the Minister may grant exclusive rights to explore for and exploit minerals on public lands through leases (s.3), but such rights must be allocated through competitive bidding and awarded to the highest bidder (s.4(1))[30]. This competitive bidding mechanism places investors in a position where they must independently assess geological potential and the economic value of exploitation rights before submitting bids, thereby incorporating exploration risks into the market competition process.
In addition, Canada’s mineral law framework emphasizes ensuring the integrity and competitiveness of investor selection processes, including mechanisms to prevent collusion, administrative interference, or conduct that distorts bidding outcomes[31]. At the same time, the granting of exploitation rights is typically associated with specific requirements regarding technical capacity, performance obligations, financial obligations, and legal compliance of investors[32], which are considered important instruments for screening exploration risks, limiting the selection of unqualified investors, and reducing the likelihood of future disputes or policy adjustments.
From a comparative perspective, Vietnamese law primarily approaches the allocation of exploration risks through reducing information asymmetry by strengthening the State’s role in geological surveys and the provision of baseline data. Meanwhile, Canada’s experience emphasizes investor screening mechanisms and the control of performance obligations from the stage of allocating exploitation rights. This difference provides an important reference perspective for further improving risk governance mechanisms in the auctioning of mineral exploitation rights in Viet Nam.
Fifth, the role of the community in the auction mechanism
Current law on geology and minerals recognizes local communities, households, and individuals in areas where minerals are located as subjects having rights and responsibilities in the management, protection, and supervision of mineral activities. Accordingly, communities are responsible for participating in the protection of unexploited mineral resources, supervising mineral activities, and promptly reporting violations of law to competent authorities.[33] At the same time, the law guarantees the right to provide opinions on safety, public order, and environmental protection; and requires state management authorities to provide information and to receive and handle feedback and recommendations related to mineral activities.[34] On that basis, these mechanisms enable communities to exercise social supervision, thereby contributing to enhanced transparency and accountability in the stage of implementing exploitation rights after the auction has been completed.[35]
“However, communities are not direct participants in the process of selecting investors or auctioning mineral exploitation rights. In practice, community consultation is usually conducted after exploitation rights have been granted, mainly within the framework of environmental impact assessment appraisal or the supervision of exploitation activities.[36] This approach results in local communities and stakeholders outside state authorities having little substantive influence on the initial decision to grant rights, as control over data and decision-making processes is largely concentrated in state bodies. In the context of mineral exploitation, the lack of adequate mechanisms for community access and participation at decision-making stages has been observed to increase conflicts related to interests, environmental concerns, and resource use among different social groups, and may give rise to social conflicts or disputes during project implementation.”[37]
In contrast, in Canada, particularly in relation to Indigenous communities, the legal framework imposes obligations on the State to initiate consultation at an early stage and to conduct meaningful consultation before issuing any decisions that may affect their rights and interests.[38] At the same time, studies on governance in the mining sector indicate that the actual operation of a project depends not only on its “legal validity” but also on the level of acceptance and sustained support of affected communities; in the absence of such acceptance, the risks of social conflict and “social costs” may increase, potentially leading to delays, opposition, or complications in project approval procedures.[39] Therefore, the process of selecting investors in the mining sector is not based solely on economic and technical criteria, but is also significantly influenced by the level of consensus and acceptance of Indigenous communities regarding the proposed project. In some cases, even where an entity has won an auction or has been granted rights through licensing or lease mechanisms, the project may still not proceed if the necessary agreements with Indigenous communities have not been achieved in subsequent stages.[40]
The comparison indicates that Viet Nam approaches the role of the community primarily at the post-auction supervision stage, whereas Canada considers community participation as an integral component of the allocation process, thereby directly influencing the effectiveness of implementation and the sustainability of the mechanism for auctioning mineral exploitation rights.
4. Limitations of the mechanisms for auctioning mineral exploitation rights under Vietnamese law in comparison with Canada
On the basis of comparison with the mechanism for allocating mineral exploitation rights in Canada, it can be observed that the limitations of the auction mechanism under the Law on Geology and Minerals 2024 do not only lie in the content of legal provisions, but also stem from the conditions necessary to ensure the effective functioning of the market. In particular, the differences are clearly reflected in the level of development of data infrastructure and the capacity to generate substantive competition, which are key factors determining the effectiveness of the auction mechanism in practice.[41]
First, limitations in the level of readiness and accessibility of geological data for auction purposes
Although the legal framework has established the objective of developing a unified system of geological and mineral information and data, the level of completion, availability, and actual accessibility of data serving auction activities have not yet been clearly defined and fully ensured.[42] In competitive allocation mechanisms, geological data play a crucial role in reducing information asymmetry and ensuring fair competition; therefore, if access to data remains administrative in nature, unstable, or costly, the auction mechanism will struggle to accurately reflect resource value and ensure efficient allocation of exploitation rights.[43]
A comparison with Canada reveals a notable difference: in many jurisdictions, geoscientific data and information supporting exploration and exploitation activities are developed in an open and accessible manner, enabling investors to proactively assess risks at an early stage and providing a foundation for transparent competition in the allocation of rights.[44] In contrast, in Viet Nam, recent technical reports indicate that current efforts are primarily focused on building, digitizing, and progressively integrating databases according to a roadmap. In this context, the organization and utilization of geological and mineral data still tend to follow an administrative management approach, and thus the role of data as a foundation for fostering substantive competition in auction activities has not yet been fully realized at the present stage.[45]
Second, limitations of the valuation method based on auctioning the rate of mineral exploitation right fee collection
The valuation method of mineral exploitation rights through auctioning the rate of fee collection has the advantage of ensuring a minimum and relatively stable revenue for the State throughout the exploitation period. However, this approach tends to reduce the value of mineral exploitation rights to a single financial parameter, which does not fully reflect the factors constituting the economic value of such rights.[46] Meanwhile, recent studies on the design of revenue collection and allocation mechanisms in the mining sector indicate that the net economic value of a project depends heavily on geological uncertainty, exploration risks, cost structures, as well as environmental and social obligations; therefore, mechanisms based on a single indicator often fail to capture the substantial differences among mining areas and may distort investor selection signals.[47]
Practical mineral resource management in Viet Nam in recent years has also revealed certain consequences arising from this approach. A typical example is the auction of exploitation rights for a sand mine on the Tien River in An Giang Province in 2021, in which a sand mine with reserves of approximately 2.4 million m³ had a starting price of VND 7.2 billion, but the winning enterprise offered a bid exceeding VND 2,800 billion, hundreds of times higher than the starting price. Subsequently, the enterprise failed to fulfill its financial obligations and forfeited its deposit, prompting the competent authority to consider cancelling the auction result.[48] This case demonstrates that when the investor selection process relies primarily on a single financial criterion, the winning bid may reflect short-term expectations or competitive strategies of enterprises rather than their actual capacity to implement the mining project. This not only increases the risk of auction failure but may also prolong the allocation process and reduce the efficiency of resource management.
Canada’s experience shows that, in competitive mechanisms for allocating mineral rights, selection criteria are not based solely on price. Instead, such criteria are designed as a combination of work programs, investment commitments, technical and financial capacity, environmental requirements, and social obligations related to community interests. This approach facilitates the screening of eligible right holders from the outset and improves the quality of project implementation.[49] In addition, current transparency standards in governance require the clear disclosure of technical and financial criteria applied in investor selection, and, where prescribed by law, information related to consultation processes or the consent of affected communities. The disclosure of such information is considered a necessary condition to limit discretion in decision-making and to enhance the accountability of competent authorities in granting exploitation rights.[50] From a policy perspective, the above practical experience indicates that designing auction mechanisms primarily based on a single financial parameter is insufficient to ensure the selection of suitable investors, particularly in the mining sector, where project value depends simultaneously on geological conditions, technical capacity, cost structures, and environmental and social obligations. Although in recent years competent authorities have reviewed auction procedures and participation conditions for enterprises, overall, the integration of criteria assessing project implementation capacity and technical commitments into the process of allocating exploitation rights remains limited and has not yet been comprehensively developed.
Third, allocation of exploration risks in the mechanism for auctioning mineral exploitation rights
The allocation of exploration risks in the mechanism for auctioning mineral exploitation rights in Viet Nam is currently not entirely appropriate. Although the State develops and provides geological data to reduce initial information risks, exploration risks are not fully incorporated into the valuation mechanism in auctions, making it difficult for auction outcomes to accurately reflect differences in geological conditions across mining areas.[51]
Practical mineral resource management in Viet Nam reveals notable consequences of this limitation. A commonly cited example is the development process of titanium mining projects in Binh Thuan Province, which is considered to have the largest titanium reserves in the country.[52] In previous planning and licensing stages, many titanium areas were identified based on geological survey results at a general level, primarily aimed at assessing resource potential. However, when enterprises conducted detailed exploration for exploitation purposes, some projects encountered difficulties due to actual geological conditions differing from initial forecasts, such as the uneven distribution of titanium minerals in red sand layers, lower mineral content than expected, or significantly higher costs for overburden removal and environmental rehabilitation than initially estimated.[53] These factors substantially altered the economic efficiency of projects and, in some cases, required enterprises to adjust exploitation plans or extend implementation timelines.
This case illustrates a structural limitation in the design of the auction mechanism for mineral exploitation rights in Viet Nam: exploration risks and the degree of geological uncertainty are not adequately reflected in the valuation and allocation mechanisms. While enterprises bear most of the exploration risks, financial obligations are determined relatively rigidly through the rate of mineral exploitation right fee collection. This mismatch may lead to two consequences. First, in order to compensate for geological risks, investors tend to adopt conservative bidding strategies, thereby reducing the intensity of competition and the effectiveness of resource value capture through auctions. Second, if financial obligations are set at a high level while actual geological conditions are less favorable than expected, enterprises may face difficulties in maintaining project efficiency, leading to adjustments in project timelines, extraction scale, or requests for revisions of financial obligations. These situations not only reduce the effectiveness of the auction mechanism but may also create pressure for policy adjustments during project implementation.
From a policy perspective, practical experience from titanium projects in Binh Thuan Province indicates the need to design mechanisms for allocating exploitation rights that take into account the level of exploration risk in each mining area, for example by linking the reliability of geological data with valuation methods or applying appropriate risk-sharing instruments. However, in current law and mineral resource management practice in Viet Nam, the linkage between exploration risks and valuation mechanisms in auctions of mineral exploitation rights has not yet been clearly and systematically established. Therefore, this limitation has not been comprehensively addressed and continues to pose challenges to the effectiveness of the auction mechanism as well as to the long-term stability of mineral resource exploitation policy.
Fourth, the role of the community in the mechanism for auctioning mineral exploitation rights
Article 8 of the Law on Geology and Minerals 2024 recognizes the rights and responsibilities of communities in areas where minerals are exploited primarily in the forms of benefit-sharing, participation in providing opinions, and supervision of mineral exploitation activities, but does not establish the role of the community as a criterion or procedural step in the mechanism for auctioning mineral exploitation rights. Meanwhile, Canada’s experience shows that community factors, particularly those relating to Indigenous communities, may directly affect the legality and feasibility of exploitation rights from the allocation stage.[54] Recent studies indicate that consultation obligations and the consent of Indigenous communities constitute a key condition, which, if not addressed at an early stage, may lead to project delays or prolonged legal disputes.[55]
From this comparison, it can be observed that although the Law on Geology and Minerals 2024 recognizes the role of the community in supervision and resource protection, in the provisions governing the auction of mineral exploitation rights, the law does not incorporate community factors as a direct criterion or procedural step for selecting the successful bidder. Therefore, social factors are typically considered through other legal mechanisms and at subsequent stages of the project lifecycle, rather than being used as a screening tool at the stage of allocating exploitation rights.
Practice in Viet Nam also demonstrates the importance of community factors in the implementation of mining projects. For example, the Thach Khe iron mine project in Ha Tinh Province, which is considered to have the largest iron reserves in Southeast Asia.[56] Although the project was granted an exploitation license many years ago, during the preparation for implementation, numerous concerns were raised by local authorities and communities regarding potential environmental impacts, effects on the livelihoods of coastal residents, and risks to the regional ecosystem[57]. These debates persisted for many years and ultimately led to the suspension of the project for further reassessment of its economic and social efficiency as well as environmental impacts. This case shows that when community factors and the level of social acceptance are not adequately considered at the stage of allocating exploitation rights, issues related to community consensus may arise at later stages of the project lifecycle, increasing the risk of delays or project adjustments. From a policy perspective, this practical experience indicates that if social factors such as the level of consensus of local communities, benefit-sharing mechanisms, and impact mitigation measures are not taken into account at the stage of decision-making and allocation of exploitation rights, the risk of social conflicts and project delays may increase. Although current law recognizes the role of the community in supervising and providing opinions on mining activities, the integration of community factors as a criterion or procedural step in the auction mechanism for mineral exploitation rights has not yet been clearly designed; therefore, this limitation has not been comprehensively addressed in practice in mineral resource management in Viet Nam.
5. Recommendations for improving the mechanism for auctioning mineral exploitation rights in Viet Nam towards effective resource governance and sustainable development
The above analysis indicates that the limitations of the mechanism for auctioning mineral exploitation rights in Viet Nam do not only stem from the implementation of the law, but also relate to the design of the constituent elements of the auction mechanism, including the system of geological information serving auctions, valuation methods and investor selection criteria, the allocation of exploration risks, as well as the treatment of social factors in the process of allocating rights. Therefore, the improvement of the auction mechanism should be approached from two dimensions: (i) improving the legal design of the auction mechanism, and (ii) enhancing the effectiveness of its implementation in practice.
First, improving the mechanism for disclosure and utilization of geological data for auction purposes
Practical analysis shows that the limitations of the current mechanism for auctioning mineral exploitation rights do not arise from the lack of a legal basis for geological data, but mainly from the manner in which data are organized, operated, and disclosed in practice. The Law on Geology and Minerals 2024 has established the principle that the State shall develop and uniformly manage the system of geological and mineral information and data; however, if not concretized through clear obligations on information disclosure, this principle is unlikely to function effectively as a foundation for an efficient auction mechanism.
From the perspective of improving implementing legislation, detailed regulations should clearly define the minimum scope of information that must be disclosed prior to the organization of auctions for mineral exploitation rights, including data on geological conditions, boundaries and scale of mining areas, results of basic surveys conducted by the State, as well as constraints or specific conditions applicable to exploitation activities. At the same time, the law should establish mandatory requirements regarding the timing and methods of information disclosure, in order to ensure that access to data by auction participants is conducted in an equal and stable manner. This approach contributes to addressing information asymmetry, enhancing the predictability of legal obligations, and reducing the risk of disputes during the post-auction implementation stage.
Second, improving valuation methods and selection criteria in auctions
Under the current design of the mechanism for auctioning mineral exploitation rights, the determination of the starting price is primarily based on the rate of mineral exploitation right fee collection, thereby ensuring a minimum level of revenue for the State. However, from a legal perspective, this approach remains mechanical as it does not fully reflect differences in geological conditions, levels of exploration risk, and extraction costs across mining areas.
In the context where the Law on Geology and Minerals 2024 continues to affirm the role of auctions as the primary mechanism for allocating exploitation rights, this gives rise to the need to redesign the method for determining the starting price in the direction of granting controlled evaluative discretion to competent state authorities, on the basis of geological information held and disclosed by the State. Accordingly, implementing legislation should allow for adjustments to the starting price within certain margins, linked to the specific characteristics of each mining area, rather than automatically treating the rate of fee collection as a parameter fully reflecting the economic value of exploitation rights.
In addition, if the auction of mineral exploitation rights is designed purely based on the highest bid criterion, the law may tend to equate this mechanism with ordinary asset auctions, whereas mineral exploitation rights are inherently associated with long-term investment obligations and significant technical risks. Therefore, a legal implication drawn from comparative analysis is the need to clearly establish a legal basis for combining financial criteria with non-financial criteria in auctions, particularly technical capacity, exploitation plans, and environmental protection obligations. This evaluation mechanism should be specifically regulated in implementing regulations, rather than being controlled solely through ex post requirements after exploitation rights have been allocated.
Third, designing mechanisms for allocating exploration risks in auctions
Practice shows that exploration risks have not been fully integrated into the valuation mechanism in auctions of mineral exploitation rights. The core issue does not lie in the lack of geological data, but in how current law translates information on exploration risks into price signals in the auction process. Therefore, the implementation of the Law on Geology and Minerals 2024 should aim at improving the legal mechanism so that exploration risks are structurally reflected in auction design.
Specifically, implementing legislation should provide for the classification of mining areas based on levels of geological risk, on the basis of data from basic geological surveys conducted by the State, thereby establishing a legal basis for determining or adjusting financial parameters in auctions. This approach would allow the starting price or auction margins to relatively reflect the degree of geological uncertainty across mining areas, rather than allowing exploration risks to be averaged out within a uniform rate of fee collection.
At the same time, the law should clarify the principles governing the allocation of exploration risks between the State and investors. Accordingly, geological risks that have been identified and disclosed by the State at the auction stage should be considered risks to be borne by investors when formulating their bids; conversely, geological discrepancies of an objective nature that fall outside the scope of disclosed information should only be addressed through clearly predefined legal mechanisms. This approach both limits incentives for excessively conservative bidding and reduces pressure to adjust financial obligations or policies during the exploitation phase.
Fourth, integrating community factors into the mechanism for allocating exploitation rights
The limitations of current law indicate that community factors have not yet been integrated as a criterion or procedural step constituting the mechanism for auctioning mineral exploitation rights, but are primarily addressed through regulatory mechanisms at the project implementation stage. From the perspective of legal design, the issue does not lie in the fact the the Law on Geology and Minerals 2024 fails to recognize the rights and responsibilities of the community, but rather in that this social factor has not been translated into a component of the mechanism for allocating exploitation rights at the auction stage.
A comparison with Canada’s experience shows that community factors may carry direct legal significance for the legality and enforceability of mineral exploitation rights. In Canadian legal practice, requirements for consultation and the assessment of social impacts are introduced at the stage of allocating rights, thereby ensuring that major social risks are identified early. This approach demonstrates that integrating community factors does not diminish market efficiency, but instead contributes to strengthening legal stability and the long-term feasibility of project implementation. Accordingly, implementing legislation of the Law on Geology and Minerals 2024 should design legal instruments to incorporate community factors into the auction mechanism in a selective and feasible manner. Specifically, it is necessary to consider providing for mandatory assessment and disclosure of basic social impacts relating to areas put up for auction as required input data for auction dossiers; at the same time, it should allow for the integration of non-financial criteria relating to community consultation plans, benefit-sharing mechanisms, and social impact mitigation measures in the process of selecting the successful bidder. This approach enables early screening of investors’ capacity to manage social risks, thereby reducing the likelihood of conflicts and project delays, while aligning the auction mechanism for mineral exploitation rights with sustainable development objectives at the local level.
6. Conclusion
In the context where the Law on Geology and Minerals 2024 enters the implementation phase, improving the mechanism for auctioning mineral exploitation rights should be approached as an issue of institutional organization and operation, rather than merely compliance with legal procedures. The comparison between Viet Nam and Canada shows that the effectiveness of auctions for exploitation rights primarily depends on the quality and level of disclosure of geological information, valuation methods and selection criteria, the allocation of exploration risks, as well as the treatment of social factors from the stage of allocating rights. On that basis, the implementation of the Law on Geology and Minerals 2024 should focus on concretizing its principles through legal mechanisms governing the disclosure and access to geological data for auction purposes, designing flexible valuation methods, allocating exploration risks in a transparent and controlled manner, and gradually integrating the role of the community into the auction mechanism. This approach aims to ensure that the auction of mineral exploitation rights operates substantively, limits the need for subsequent policy adjustments, and contributes to orienting mineral resource exploitation towards stability and sustainability in the future.
REFERENCES
1. National Assembly (2013), Constitution, as amended and supplemented in 2025.
2. National Assembly (2024), Law on Geology and Minerals 2024.
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* MSc., Doctoral Candidate, University of Law, Hue University. Email: nqtuan.dhl25@hueuni.edu.vn, date of acceptance: March 26, 2026.
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